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I Introduction
Scientific expertise continues to confound the courts years after the
Supreme Court's Daubert trio was supposed to solve the dilemma of admit-
ting science into legal argument. The resulting confusion is most apparent in
capital sentencing proceedings, in which the judiciary has flung wide the gates
to wholly unscientific expert testimony. For a democratic system, in which
the rule of law attempts to answer the problems of power and freedom by
making the law apply to everyone and by providing rational criteria for
distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate uses of power, this lack of rational-
ity has consequences. In this Article, I argue that judicial failure to scrutinize
expert testimony relating to future dangerousness results in a massive failure
of intellectual due process.2
1. Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993) (instructing the
federal judiciary to make admissibility determinations based on an analysis of the scientific
validity of the proffered testimony and on whether the testimony "fits" the issues in the case).
Daubert was followed by General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1997)
(reiterating the trial judge's mandate to review testimony for scientific validity and "fit" and
allowing a district court to reject expert testimony relying on studies too dissimilar to the facts
before it). The Court extended the purview of Daubert to technical as well as scientific
evidence in the last case in the trilogy, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141
(1999).
2. See Scott Brewer, Scienific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107
YALE L.J. 1535, 1539 (1998) (developing the concept of intellectual due process as a norm "that
places important epistemic constraints on the reasoning process by which legal decisionmakers
apply laws to individual litigants ... [and requires] that the decisionmaking process not be
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In a democracy, in which the enunciated goal of the rule of law is the
search for truth in a system that aspires to rationality, accurate information is
a prerequisite.3 This goal begs two questions, of course. What is true? And
what is rational? I argue with Quine that truth is empirical and that rationality
consists of a structured reasoning process relating sensory input to a web of
theoretical output.4 One description of reality is emphatically not just as good
as another. That is why courts look to science in the first place: science has
arbitrary from an epistemic point of view"). As Professor Wetlaufer explained, "In law, assent
is secured through an appeal to reason and logic, through a strong claim to objectivity and
certain knowledge, through a voice that claims objectivity and authority." Gerald Wetlaufer,
Rhetoric and Its Denial in LegalDiscourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545, 1565 (1990).
3. See WILLAM TWDNN, THEORmS OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIOMORE 89-90
(1985) (explaining the truth theory of adjudication as the foundation of good government and
remarking that "justice absolutely depends upon it"). This kind of statement tends to make
people nervous in a. postmodem world, where people doubt the achievability of truth, where
many believe that truth is contextual, and where different perspectives on truth abound. See,
e.g., DENNIS PATTERsoN, LAW AND TRuTH 150 (1996) (characterizing postmodernism as
emphasizing the idea that "no practice or discourse enjoys a privileged position vis-a-vis others"
and asserting that "truth in law is a matter of forms of legal argument"). Some postmodem
scholars reject the concept of law as a search for truth entirely, seeing it rather as a contest for
power. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System, 38 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 5, 13 (1996) (arguing that the adversary system is not a search for truth but a
contest, the goal of which is to win). However, this Article argues that just because our attempts
to discover the truth may be only relatively successful, and just because we may have different
perspectives on what truth is, does not mean that we should abandon the search or that the effort
to improve the process should be unavailing. For an amusing and enlightening explanation of
why both visions (law as a search for truth and law as a contest) may be correct, see Arthur A.
Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989, 1005 (1978) (acknowledging that although the adversary
system "does seem more or less well adapted to providing the more or less accurate data needed
for the rational operation [of the system and is] largely capable of answering the question 'what
happened' at the legally relevant time," there are important ways in which it is also a contest).
4. WILLARDV. QUINE, PURSur OF TRUTH 16-19(1990). This does not mean that fact
and value are unrelated or that sensory data determine scientific theory. On the contrary, the
data can always support more than one theory. See generally WHLARD V. QUINE, Epistemology
Naturalized, in ONTOLOGICAL RELATV1TY AND OTHER ESSAYS 69 (1969) (explaining that the
under-determination of theory by evidence means that the data will always support more than
one theory). Science is true, as opposed to metaphysics, religion or astrology, because all
questions are ultimately questions of empirical fact, and science answers these questions more
successfully. Quine explained: "I see the question of truth as one to be settled within science,
there being no higher tribunal." Widlard V. Quine, Comment on Lavener, in PERSPECTIVES ON
QUE 229 (Robert B. Barrett & Roger F. Gibson eds., 1990). In terms of the reasoning
process, Quine does not see that scientific logic is anything special; it is just like common sense,
only more careful. See WILLAUD V. QUINE, The Scope and Language of Science, in THE WAYS
OF PARAOx AND OTHER ESSAYS 215,220 (1976) ("The scientist is indistinguishable from the
common man in his sense of evidence, except that the scientist is more careful."). For an
elegant exposition of Quine's philosophy, see generally Brian Leiter, Why Quine Is Not a
Postnodernist 50 SMU L. REV. 1739 (1997).
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primacy in describing the world. It works. Reality bites. Descriptive claims
need to correspond to the natural world, and the theory articulated for those
claims must be articulable, falsifiable, and open to critique.' In addition,
empirical information about how people actually reach decisions is important
in evaluating the truth-seeking and rationality functions of the law.6
In our adversary system, the truth-seeking rationality goal of the rule of
law forms the basis for evidentiary rules. The basic idea is that the methodol-
ogies of the justice system should have truth-generating capacity-a notion
of due process.7 A second consequence of the aspiration to rationality is a
concern for accurate evidentiary input: in order to reach a justifiable decision,
courts must base reasoning on trustworthy information.' A third consequence
is that even trustworthy facts must have some logical tendency to prove or
disprove an issue in the case.' This framework for justice is the inspiration for
5. Erica Beecher-Monas, The Heuristics of Intellectual Due Process: A Primer for
Triers of Science, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1563, 1584-86 (2000) (describing Karl Popper's theory
of science as including the idea that valid theories must be articulable, falsifiable, and open to
critique).
6. See Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of
Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1494 (2001) (arguing that "theorizing is constrained by
empirical facts" and that "we cannot craft epistemic norms (norms that would guide our
acquisition of knowledge) without empirical information about how the human cognitive
apparatus actually works").
7. In other words, "a process reasonably designed to ascertain the truth." JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 239 (1971); see also WMnAM L. TWDINNG, RETHINKING EVIDENE 107
(1990) (discussing the rationalist tradition in evidence scholarship and its main epistemological
assumption that the purpose of adjudication is to discover an objectively knowable truth, while
at the same time acknowledging that "the notion of 'fact' in adjudication is more problematic
than the orthodox view suggests .... Thus it is misleading to suggest that legal enquiries into
questions of fact are value-free"). Even law and economics adheres to the notion of legal
process as a search for truth. E.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal
Procedure andJudicialAdministration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1978). As Posner put it, judicial
error is "a source of social costs and the reduction of error is a goal of the procedural system."
Id. at 401. That is why, Posner explains, a procedural rule such as the constitutional
exclusionary rule "is exceptional, and is recognized--and often bitterly criticized--as such."
Id.
8. The belief that decisions based on correct information come closer to the truth is the
basis of normative epistemology, including "norms governing how individuals should acquire
and weigh evidence as well as, ultimately, form beliefs." Allen & Leiter, supra note 6, at 1498
(contending that the rules of evidence "structure the epistemic process by which jurors arrive
at beliefs about disputed matters of fact at trials").
9. Sometimes this concept is called "materiality," and it is considered to be one of the
generative principles of the law of evidence. See Robert P. Bums, Notes on the Future of
Evidence Law, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 69, 70 (2001) (noting that the generative principle of material-
ity, now subsumed under the relevance requirement, permits into evidence only that evidence
that is "of consequence" to the "legitimate determination of the action").
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the rules of evidence, and a fundamental tenet is that only facts having
relevance-rational probative value--should be admissible in the search for
truth.10
In one important category of proceedings, however, courts toss this
framework to the winds. Sentencing hearings have become an evidentiary
free-for-all." Particularly in capital sentencing proceedings, in which death
is supposed to be different, courts permit juries to hear expert testimony that
even the most optimistic could only characterize as not "always wrong."12
This is a far cry from the truth-generating methodologies supposedly funda-
10. A corollary is that all facts that have rational probative value should be admissible
unless forbidden under a competing concern of the justice system (for example, the improper
uses of state power implicated in the exclusionary rule). TwINIG, supra note 7, at 152. But
see Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative History,
27 RUTG ES L.J. 77, 82 (1995) (contending that evidence law grew out of the adversarial system
as part of the "Sixth Amendment rights that affirmatively grant an accused the opportunity for
meaningful defense advocacy"). The doctrines of relevance and probativity are expressed as
follows under the Federal Rules of Evidence:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 401. And:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presenta-
tion of cumulative evidence.
FED. R. EvD. 403.
11. Among the various types of evidence that are excluded from trials under rules of
evidence but constitutionally permitted at sentencing are victim impact statements, acquitted
conduct, and unadjudicated conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 154-55
(1997) (per curiam) (stating that a "not guilty" verdict does not preclude admissibility of
conduct underlying the acquitted charge during sentencing, as long as the prosecutor proves the
conduct by a preponderance of the evidence); Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 10 (1994)
(finding a prior death sentence admissible in capital sentencing); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808, 827 (1991) (declaring victim impact evidence constitutionally admissible under the Eighth
Amendment). Hearsay is the most prevalent category of evidence that courts both proscribe
during the guilt phase of the trial and widely admit at sentencing. See, e.g., Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241, 244-52 (1949) (finding it constitutionally permissible to rely on a
presentence report because of the need for a broad spectrum of information at sentencing). For
an excellent discussion of the applicability of the rules of evidence at sentencing, see Deborah
Young, Fact-Finding at Federal Sentencing: Why the Guidelines Should Meet the Rules, 79
CORNELLL. REv. 299,302-03 (1994) (arguing that the Federal Rules of Evidence should apply
at federal sentencing).
12. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 900 (1983) (refusing to exclude future dangerous-
ness testimony because the defense could not show that "psychiatrists are always wrong with
respect to future dangerousness, only most of the time").
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mental to due process and at the opposite end of the spectrum from what
currently happens in civil trials, in which experts must demonstrate the
reliability of their testimony. 3
Outside of sentencing proceedings, courts have approached the issue of
reliability with respect to scientific testimony in two basic ways. The first is
the Frye4 general consensus approach, in which courts deem scientific
testimony trustworthy if a majority of scientists agree that it is-assigning the
gatekeeping task to scientists.' 5 Alternatively, the Federal Rules of Evidence
now assign the gatekeeping responsibility to judges.' 6 My position, as I have
13. See generally Julie 0. Shoop, Judges Are Gaining Confidence in Assessing Expert
Evidence, Study Finds, 38 TRIAL 92 (2002) (discussing a report by the Rand Institute for Civil
Justice, which found that Daubert has had a significant impact on the admissibility of expert
testimony in civil trials, so that judges are closely scrutinizing relevance and reliability, resulting
in a dramatic increase in the percentage of excluded expert testimony in products liability trials
and a surge in summary judgments against the plaintiffs). This increased scrutiny of scientific
evidence has not affected criminal trials nearly so dramatically. See, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas,
Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV.
55, 78-82 (1998) (describing the "maelstrom" of unresolved issues created by or unaddressed
in Daubert and the changes that it entailed); Paul C. Gianelli, Scientific Evidence in Civil and
Criminal Cases, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 103,113-17 (2001) (discussing the myriad instances in which
criminal judges fail to take Daubert seriously).
14. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
15. See id. at 1014 (explaining that scientific testimony must "be sufficiently established
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs"). For years, courts
based the validity determination on scientific consensus, under which scientists themselves
would decide--more or less by majority rule-whether a given assertion was scientifically
valid. Only if the scientific community generally accepted a given scientific technique or
conclusion would it be admissible in court. This general acceptance rule of Frye was a bad idea
because general acceptance alone simply is not a measure of validity; the scientific community
has rubber-stamped lots of inane ideas and denigrated lots of good ones for reasons that had
absolutely nothing to do with "scientific validity" and much to do with politics, context, and
culture. The kind of research done in the first place depends on the availability of funding,
which may be politicized and is, in any event, scarce. Once the hurdles of funding have been
overcome, publication is by no means assured. Far more papers are written than ever will be
published, often consigning research results to obscurity. Moreover, interpretation is a human
activity, not a process of nature. The collection and explanation of scientific data is a rhetorical
act. In essence, the effect of leaving the validity determination to scientific consensus is to cede
the power to determine political questions of culpability to an extra-judicial (and extra-govern-
mental) power.
16. Rule 702 now provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,
and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of
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argued elsewhere, is that judges are the proper gatekeepers for a number of
reasons, but primarily because the structured inquiry process of Daubert gives
judges a framework for analysis and a requirement to jus-
tify-rationalize--their decisions.1" Whichever approach they use, however,
trustworthiness, i.e., relevance, is a crucial aspect of admissibility. And courts
use neither the Frye approach nor the Daubert approach (codified in the
federal rules), nor any other trustworthiness inquiry, in one critical area of
sentencing proceedings: expert testimony about the defendant's future
dangerousness.
This result is due in large part to the Supreme Court's decision in Bare-
foot v. Estelle."5 This Article argues that the Court decided Barefoot wrongly,
both as a matter of evidentiary due process and because it was empirically
wrong about the ability of the adversary system to sort out the reliable from
the unreliable expert testimony. 9 Moreover, this Article argues that Barefoot
is egregiously wrong-headed by current standards for relevance2 and that
Barefoot's effect on capital sentencing proceedings has been pernicious and
pervasive, undermining basic rule-of-law precepts. Perhaps it is true, as
Justices Blackmun and Powell argued, that courts cannot administer the death
penalty in a way that meets constitutional requirements.
the case.
FED. R. EvID. 702. In addition to federal courts, in which the federal rules are mandatory,
thirty-eight states have adopted the rules as the basis for their state procedure. Daniel A. Krauss
& Bruce D. Sales, The Effects of Clinical and Scientific Expert Testimony on Juror Decision
Making in Capital Sentencing, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 267,270 (2001).
17. See generally Beecher-Monas, supra note 5 (outlining a heuristic to guide judges in
deciding admissibility questions).
18. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 892 (1983) (permitting experts to testify about
future dangerousness as a constitutional matter).
19. Krauss & Sales, supra note 16, discusses research suggesting that jurors are incapable
of differentiating more scientifically valid expert testimony from less accurate testimony.
20. Notably, no one persuasively argues that the testimony at issue in Barefoot could meet
Daubert standards. See, e.g., 1 DAVIDL. FAIGMANETAL.,MoDERNSCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 2 (2d ed. 2002) (arguing that Barefoot and Daubert
are irreconcilable).
21. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145-46 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(observing that "the inevitability of factual, legal, and moral error gives us a system that we
know must wrongly kill some defendants, a system that fails to deliver the fair, consistent, and
reliable sentences of death required by the Constitution"); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating
and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today sArbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punish-
ment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345,347 (1998) (noting that "Justice Powell came
to a similar conclusion after his retirement"). Notably, two states, Illinois and Maryland, have
reached similar conclusions and have placed a moratorium on death penalty prosecutions
because of due process concerns. See Dirk Johnson, Illinois, Citing Verdict Errors, Bars
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If, as this Article contends, the test by which courts should judge an
evidentiary practice is whether it increases the likelihood that the
truth-defined as correspondence to the real world-will be attained, expert
future dangerousness testimony fails to make the grade. This Article argues
that although valid reasons may justify abandoning strict adherence to the
rules of evidence when it comes to sentencing proceedings-and I am skepti-
cal about this proposition-at a very minimum, expert testimony should be
admissible only if it is scientifically valid.2
The rule that this Article proposes is a constitutionalization of Daubert,
at least with respect to death penalty proceedings. The judge's task is not to
decide whether the expert's proposition is correct, but to decide whether,
given the current state of knowledge about the issue, as propounded by
competing experts, it is sufficiently trustworthy to come into evidence in
order to prove or disprove a legal issue (in this case, the risk of future vio-
lence).23 In sum, the reason that we need gatekeepers is to ensure that the
statements offered into evidence comport with permissible legal theories,
embedded as they are in cultural systems of belief, assumptions and claims
about the world.24 Although what we seek to know are the facts, as Quine
explains, facts are inevitably theory-laden.2  Therefore, in an adversary
system, the judge's role is to manage coherence by reference to what is
relevant to the legal determination. And Daubert is unequivocal that rele-
vance in the context of expert testimony means scientific validity.
Executions, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 1, 2000, at Al (describing the decision to bar executions in
Illinois).
22. Notably, one-third of the prisoners exonerated by the Actual Innocence Project had
been convicted on the basis of "tainted or fraudulent science." BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL
INNOCENCE 246 (2000).
23. Contrary to Professor Brewer's metaphor, the judge's task is not like having to decide
which of "two groups of expert mathematicians [who] disagree about a complex mathematical
question-say, whether Princeton mathematician Andrew Wiles really did solve 'Fermat's Last
Theorem,' which no mathematician had been able to prove since Louis Fermat first propounded
it about 360 years ago"-is correct. Brewer, supra note 2, at 1538. The judge's task is not to
decide whether Wiles's solution is correct, but to decide whether, given the current state of
knowledge about the courtroom analog to Wiles's solution, as propounded by competing
experts, it is sufficiently trustworthy to come into evidence in order to prove or disprove a legal
issue (in this case, risk of future violence).
24. For the theory that knowledge is embedded in a network of meanings, see WILLARD
V. QUINE, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 20-46 (2d d.
1980).
25. WILARD V. QUINE, Epistemology Naturalized, in ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND
OTHER ESSAYS 83 (1969), explains the "reciprocal containment" of "epistemology in natural
science and science in epistemology." Thus, Quine is committed to empiricism, but finds that
knowledge and theory are inseparable.
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This Article argues that relevance is not "merely" a matter of evidentiary
rules, but rather a constitutional minimum, a requirement of due process and
a fundamental fairness requirement of the nile of law. Contrary to the Court's
contention in Barefoot, the adversary process cannot be trusted "to sort out the
reliable from the unreliable evidence and opinion about future dangerous-
ness." '26 Rather, as the Supreme Court explained in Daubert, the requirement
that expert testimony be helpful to the jury, "supported by appropriate
validation-i.e., 'good grounds,' based upon what is known," is a condition
of relevance.' This Article examines the dynamics of jury decisionmaking
in the context of capital sentencing decisions to explain why the relevance
requirement is a constitutional concern of fundamental fairness and how that
requirement plays out with respect to expert testimony on future dangerous-
ness.
This Article proceeds in six parts. Following this Introduction, Part II
discusses the prevalence of future dangerousness evidence in capital sentenc-
ing hearings. Part III addresses the Supreme Court's decision in Barefoot v.
Estelles and the tension between Barefoot and the Supreme Court's Daubert
trilogy of cases (and their codification in the Federal Rules of Evidence).29
Part IV addresses what is wrong with clinical predictions and why admitting
them into capital sentencing proceedings violates basic premises of the rule
of law and the adversary system. In terms of promoting the acquisition of
knowledge for capital jurors to make their life-or-death decision, permitting
experts to expound bunkum does not comport with fundamental aspects of the
rule of law. Part IV thus advocates applying the relevance and reliability
standards of Daubert to expert testimony on future dangerousness.
Part V draws on data from jury decision studies, in particular the Capital
Juror Project, and from insights into cognitive biases and human
decisionmaking to analyze the relevance, in terms of scientific validity, of
actuarial instruments currently used to assess the risk of future violence and
concludes that actuarial instruments, although they have shortcomings, offer
an improvement over the unaided judgment of juries and over clinical predic-
26. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,901 (1983).
27. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
28. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 892 (permitting experts to testify about future dangerousness
as a constitutional matter).
29. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (extending the scope
of the Daubert inquiry to technical as well as scientific evidence); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136, 144-45 (1997) (reiterating the trial judge's mandate to review testimony for scientific
validity and "fit"); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93 (instructing the federal judiciary to make
admissibility determinations based on an analysis of the scientific validity of the proffered
testimony and on whether the testimony "fits" the issues in the case).
60 WASH. &LEE L. REV 353 (2003)
tions of violence. This Article concludes that judicial gatekeeping standards
for scientific evidence, as outlined by the Daubert trio of cases, are an essen-
tial component of due process and that the trustworthiness of expert scientific
testimonyw-in a system that aspires to rationality-is a minimum prerequisite.
II. Expert Future Dangerousness Testimony in Capital
Sentencing Proceedings
Expert testimony about future dangerousness currently takes two forms:
clinical predictions and actuarial predictions. By far the most common form
of testimony is the clinical prediction. In this testimony, the expert, usually
a psychiatrist but sometimes a psychologist, proffers an opinion based on a
courtroom hypothetical, with or without a prior examination of the defendant.
Even when clinicians have the opportunity for an extensive examination,
however, studies show that clinical predictions are highly inaccurate, A
number of factors explain this inaccuracy. Clinical decisionmakers tend to
assume erroneously the representativeness of events by ignoring sample
sizes3" and base rates. Ignoring base rates is a particular problem in predicting
violence when the base rate of violent behavior is low overall and varies
among different population subgroups. 31
In addition, these studies show both that clinicians tend to think that they
have more information than they really do32 and that they are poor at making
extreme judgments. 33 Clinical judgments tend to ignore the well-known
difficulty in predicting statistically rare events (like violence).34 Stereotypes
and prejudices are just as likely to taint the decisions of clinicians as those of
lay people.35 As a result, clinicians are no better than lay people in making
30. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Repre-
sentativeness, 3 CooNrrxvE PSYCHOL. 430, 433 (1972). Decisionmakers do not consciously
employ these shortcuts, but rather they operate on a subliminal level to affect decision. Id.
31. See VERNONL. QUINsEYET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISINGAND MANAGING
RISK 60 (1998) (explaining how the statistical base-rate problem affects predictions of danger-
ousness).
32. Id. at 56 ("[Pleople often think they have more information than they actually have,
they are therefore more willing to make more extreme judgments than warranted.").
33. See Hillel J. Einhom & Robin M. Hogarth, Confidence in Judgment: Persistence of
the Illusion of Validity, 85 PSYCHOL REv. 395, 396 (1978) (noting that clinicians tend to have
more confidence in predictive variables with extreme values than is warranted).
34. See JOHN W. PARRY ET AL., ABA COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH AND PHYSICAL
DIAEILiyLAW,NATIONALBENCHBOOKONPSYCHIATRICANDPSYCHOLOoICALEVIDENEAND
TESTimONY 20 (1998) [hereinafter BENCHBOOK] (noting that "it is difficult to predict with
certainty occurrences of statistically rare events").
35. See CHPJSTOPHER WEBSTERET AL., THE VIOLENCE PREDICTIONSCHEME: ASSESSING
DANGEROUSNESS IN HIGH RISK MEN 28 n.5 (1994) (quoting Judge Bazelon's opinion that a
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these predictions. 6 Moreover, no information is available about the individual
error rate of the particular expert proffering a future dangerousness opinion."
Although some experts are undoubtedly better at diagnosis and prediction than
others, there is no way to know how many times the expert has opined that
someone was dangerous when he was not (or vice-versa). Clinical judgment
thus is virtually untestable.'
Actuarial instruments attempt to correct these deficiencies by relying on
statistically analyzed data rather than personal experience.39 These instru-
ments attempt to counter human cognitive error by taking into account the
interrelationship of various risk factors and the population base rates, and by
assigning weights to the individual risk factors. Repeated studies of actuarial
methods have demonstrated them to be superior to clinical judgment standing
alone.40 Actuarial instruments do not abandon human judgment; they simply
structure it into a formal reasoning process.4 Using structured analysis offers
psychiatrist's internal values could undermine his testimony).
36. See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 62 (reporting in a study assessing predictions
of violence that "lay persons and the clinicians had few differences of opinion"); Daniel W.
Shuman & Bruce D. Sales, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony Based Upon Clinical
Judgment andScientific Research, 4 PSYCHOL PUB. POL'Y & L. 1226,1228 (1998) (noting that
"expert judgments that are clinically derived, as opposed to actuarially derived, are as suscepti-
ble to error as lay judgements").
37. See WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 35, at 25 (noting the problem of illusory correlations
when assessors-who usually have no information about the accuracy of their predic-
tions-learn of a violent action by a previously assessed patient, making that instance stand out
and giving the clinicians a mistakenly optimistic view of their own prowess).
38. See Shuman & Sales, supra note 36, at 1227 (noting the problem of unvalidated
theories and skills).
39. Although some evidence suggests that a multidisciplinary team may be able to rival
the accuracy of actuarial instruments, courts are unlikely to employ such teams in capital
sentencing determinations. See J. Fuller & J. Cowan, Risk Assessment in a Multidisciplinary
Forensic Setting: Clinical Judgement Revisited, 10 J. FORENSIC PSYCH. 276, 286 (1999)
(acknowledging that a multidisciplinary team may provide increased accuracy approaching that
of actuarial instruments). For a description and discussion of actuarial instruments used to
predict future dangerousness, see generally Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar (arcia-Rill, Chaos
at the Edge ofDanger: Predicting Violent Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L.
REV. _ (forthcoming 2003).
40. See Mark D. Cunningham & Thomas J. Reidy, Don't Confuse Me with the Facts:
Common Errors in Violence RiskAssessment at Capital Sentencing, 26 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV.
20, 28 (1999) (citing studies); Mark Dolan & Mary Doyle, Violence Risk Prediction: Clinical
and Actuarial Measures and the Role of the Psychopathy Checklist, 177 BRIT. J. PSYCi. 303,
303 (2000) (listing assessment instruments used for violence risk assessment in the mentally
disordered and citing studies). Dolan and Doyle note that "structured/systematic approaches
to violence risk prediction provide a more accurate and transparent record of the risk factors
considered and the rationale behind decisions taken." Id. at 309.
41. See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 65 ("[-Iuman judgments applied in a very
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many advantages in human decisionmaking, particularly in light of the diffi-
culty that people have in synthesizing differently weighted likelihoods of
varying significance, such as risk factors for violent behavior. 2
These instruments are only beginning to find their way into capital sen-
tencing proceedings, although prisons and other forensic settings, such as
hospitals, widely use them. In United States v. Barnette,43 the prosecution
expert used an actuarial instrument, the Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-
R), to substantiate his opinion that the defendant posed a future danger." The
court upheld the admissibility of this testimony under Daubert (although it
declined to decide whether a Daubert analysis was required).4 ' The court
found that the prosecution expert's testimony met Daubert's reliability stan-
dard because he had based his opinion on "observations of Barnette's behavior;
the actuarial approach; and the research on predicting future dangerousness. "'6
The court did not, however, analyze the scientific validity of the actuarial
approach. Thus, although the court invoked Daubert, it circumvented
Daubert's analysis requirements.
III Evidentiary Contradictions: Barefoot and Daubert
A. Barefoot and the Regime of Evidentiary Federalism
One can trace the failure of courts to address issues of scientific validity
at sentencing directly to Barefoot v. Estelle. In Barefoot, despite its previously
structured way play a large role in the actuarial prediction of violence."); Dolan & Doyle, supra
note 40, at 304 (observing that "[s]tructured clinical judgment represents a composite of
empirical knowledge and clinical/professional expertise").
42. See .RICHARDEISER&JOOPVANDERPLIGT,ATITIJDES AND DECISIONS 100(1988)
(observing that human decision "accuracy declines considerably when the number of features
or the number of alternatives increases... [and] reliability with which choice rules are used
tends to decrease as the decision-maker's information load increases"); Fuller & Cowan, supra
note 39, at 286 (finding that empirical data demonstrates that such structured analysis improves
decisionmaking considerably). Even these instruments do not obviate all the problems of
human judgment. For example, the risk factor descriptions may be vague, decreasing their
reliability. See David Carson, A RiskManagementApproach to Legal Decision-MakingAbout
'Dangerous'People, in LAW AND UNCERTAINTY: RISKS AND LEGAL PROCESS 255,258 (Robert
Baldwin ed., 1997) (noting the problem of reliability and overlap in risk factors). For example,
even trained clinicians may differ on what exactly is meant by "glibness" (a factor on the PCL-
R, an actuarial instrument) or "lack of insight" (a factor on the VRAG and the HCR-20, two
other actuarial instruments). Sometimes the factors are not independent, for example, anger and
the inability to sustain relationships. Id.
43. United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803 (4th Cir. 2000).
44. See id. at 815 (discussing Daubert, then stating that the decision to admit evidence
of PCL-R was not a clear error of judgment sufficient to reverse the lower court).
45. Idat 815-16.
46. ld. at 816.
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articulated concern for providing the jury with accurate information with
which to make its decision, the Supreme Court upheld expert testimony about
future dangerousness for which even the majority could not find any scientific
support." At issue was the constitutionality of permitting psychiatrists to
testify about the defendant's future behavior, given that such predictions are
wrong two out of three times.4
The Court based its reasoning not only on precedent, but also on the rules
of evidence, "generally extant at the federal and state levels," which, according
to the Court, "anticipate that relevant, unprivileged evidence should be admit-
ted and its weight left to the factfinder, who would have the benefit of cross-
examination and contrary evidence by the opposing party."49 The Court thus
reasoned that the testimony was admissible because the rules of evidence
deemed it admissible, and emphasized the ability of the adversary system to
weed out inaccurate information.5" At stake were federalism notions that the
Court would not interfere unless the state practice offended constitutional
minimums. The rules of evidence at the time did not require expert testimony
to undergo any scrutiny for scientific validity."
47. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983). After acknowledging the opposition
to future dangerousness testimony set out in the anicus brief of the American Psychiatric
Association stating that the unreliability of clinical predictions of dangerousness was an
"established fact," the only support that the majority could find for such testimony was one
study showing "some predictive validity" and a statement by a researcher (relied on by the state
experts). Although "the 'best' clinical research currently in existence indicates that psychiatrists
and psychologists are accurate in no more than one out of three predictions of violent behav-
ior," the researcher stated that "there may be circumstances in which prediction is both empiri-
cally possible and ethically appropriate" and hopes that "future research would clarify the
issues." Id. at 899 n.7 (emphasis added). The presence of widespread "professional doubts
about the usefulness of psychiatric predictions" should only make it that much easier to mount
a challenge to the experts. Id. Because the majority was "not persuaded that such testimony is
almost entirely unreliable," it would be up to the jury to "separate the wheat from the chaff."
Id. Contrast this analysis with the Court's analysis in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, a civil
case construing the Federal Rules of Evidence, in which the Court insisted that a trial court must
examine the expert's methodology and techniques for consistency with the expert's conclusions
and with the facts of the case at hand. 522 U.S. 136, 145-46 (1997) (declining to admit expert
testimony based on sophisticated animal and epidemiology studies because the studies lacked
"fit').
48. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 901 ('Neither the petitioner nor the Association suggests that
psychiatrists are always wrong with respect to future dangerousness, only most of the time.").
49. Id. at 898.
50. See id. (describing checks in the adversary system such as cross-examination and
contrary evidence).
51. See Michael H. Gottesman, From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or
Double Error?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 753,755 (1998) (noting that expert testimony at the time was
admissible as long as the expert was qualified), see also Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 464
n.10 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, J., concurring) (noting that "the cardinal concern of the rules of
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Two psychiatrists testified in Barefoot that the defendant "would proba-
bly commit further acts of violence and represent a continuing threat to
society." 2 They did not base their opinions on any personal examination of
the defendant nor upon any history of past violent behavior-the defendant
had prior convictions for drug offenses and unlawful possession of firearms,
but had no history of violent crime. 3 Instead, the experts based their testi-
mony on a hypothetical question based on the crime and the defendant's
conduct. 4 The Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of such testimony,
remarking that disallowing it would be like "disinvent[ing] the wheel.""5
Because courts had traditionally admitted such testimony, the Court refused
to overturn its precedent.' The Court acknowledged the opposition of the
American Psychiatric Association (the Association) to future dangerousness
testimony because of its extreme unreliability. 7 Although the Association
explained that no one, including psychiatrists, can predict with any degree of
reliability that an individual will commit other crimes in the future,8 the
Court noted that the Association did not claim that psychiatrists were always
wrong with respect to future dangerousness predictions-only that they were
admissibility for expert tesfimony-reliability-is also the paramount concern in addressing the
constitutionality of capital sentencing procedures").
52. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 884.
53. Id. at 917 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
54. See id. at 918-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (explaining the psychiatrist's method).
The prosecutor's hypothetical asked the psychiatrists to assume a number of facts (taken from
the testimony at trial): conviction for five nonviolent criminal offenses, arrests for sexual
offenses against children, a bad reputation in the eight communities in which the defendant had
lived over a period of ten years, unemployment during the two months preceding the crime,
drug use, boasting to acquaintances of plans to commit crimes, shooting a police officer without
provocation from a distance of six inches, and acting after the crime as though nothing unusual
occurred. Brief of the American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae at 5, Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
55. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983).
56. See id. (relying on precedent stating that a defendant's likelihood to commit further
crimes is a constitutional criterion for imposing the death penalty). The Court expounded that
"if it is not impossible for even a lay person sensibly to arrive at that conclusion, it makes little
sense, if any, to submit that psychiatrists, out of the entire universe of persons who might have
an opinion on the issue, would know so little about the subject that they should not be permitted
to testify." Id. at 896-97. The idea is that courts permit experts to testify because they can
assist lay persons making a decision; otherwise they would be invading the province of the jury.
But ample evidence suggests--and the Court was aware of it through the amicus brief-that the
experts are no better than lay jurors in making this decision. See, e.g., QUINSEY ET AL., supra
note 31, at 62 (observing that clinicians and lay people had little difference of opinion in
making violence predictions).
57. Barefoo4 463 U.S. at 899.
58. Id. at 896-99.
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wrong more often than not-and therefore it would not exclude such testimony
because it comported with the state's rules of evidence.59
State rules of evidence have changed since Barefoot thanks to the Su-
preme Court's ruling in Daubert. Even states that elected not to follow
Daubert and retained a general consensus standard have modified their
approach to expert testimony. What has not changed and what the Supreme
Court did not mention is that the rules of evidence do not generally apply to
sentencing hearings. Thus, if Daubert requires rethinking expert testimony
at capital sentencing, the reason must be that Daubert's foundation is a
constitutional one. This Article argues that Daubert's foundation is the
relevance and reliability of expert testimony and that this foundation is
constitutionally based.
B. Daubert, Its Progeny, and the Federal Rules
of Evidence in Death Penalty Proceedings
Justice Blackmun, who wrote the dissenting opinion in Barefoot, wrote
the majority opinion in Daubert and with it transformed the jurisprudence of
expert testimony. Explicitly addressing the Federal Rules of Evidence,
Daubert requires judges to examine the empirical basis of statements made by
experts in federal courts. Daubert held that the scientific validity and the "fit"
of expert testimony to the facts in the case are questions of reliability and
relevance.' In two subsequent cases, General Electric Co. v. Joiner1 and
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,62 the Court reiterated the Daubert standards,
expounded on its notion of "fit," and explained that judges not only must
evaluate the scientific validity of testimony based on the traditional "hard"
sciences, but also must evaluate the validity of expert testimony based on the
"soft" sciences, such as psychology. 3 Thus, Daubert's general principles
59. Id. at 904.
60. See Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 1999, 2021 (1994) (observing that "Daubert required a higher standard of
admissibility for money damages than Barefoot required for the death penalty"). Although
commentators have argued that Daubert is technically consistent with Barefoot because Daubert
involved interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence while Barefoot involved interpretation
of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, nearly. everyone acknowledges the tension
between the two decisions. See, e.g., Craig J. Albert, Challenging Deterrence: New Insights
on Capital Punishment Derived from PanelData, 60 U. PrIr. L. REv. 321,338 (1999) (assert-
ing that "it goes too far to say simply that Daubert impliedly overruled Barefoot," but acknowl-
edging that "they cannot co-exist as a matter of common sense").
61. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
62. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
63. See id. at 149 (finding that Daubert applies to all expert testimony described in
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apply to all expert testimony.' Congress subsequently amended the Federal
Rules of Evidence to codify these cases.65
These changes have profoundly affected not only the federal courts but
also state courts.' Even jurisdictions that eschew the Daubert standard in
favor of the general acceptance standard of Frye are beginning to insist that
expert testimony meet standards of scientific validity.67 Thus, even when
courts do not follow the Supreme Court's standard-that is, in many state
courts-they have an increased awareness that whatever evidence they con-
sider should be based on a sound empirical foundation.
The rationale for a gatekeeping requirement is based on relevance.6
Unreliable testimony is not relevant because it cannot assist the jury, and
assisting the jury is the only reason for admitting expert testimony. Four
"general observations" guide the inquiry into scientific validity.69 They are
testability; peer review and publication; the existence of methodological
standards, including the error rate of the methodology; and general
acceptance.70 The overall goal of these "flexible" guidelines is to evaluate
expert testimony by the standards that scientists themselves use to critique
each other's work. Relevance is thus the capstone of Daubert's scientific
validity inquiry. The relevancy requirement functions as the primary control
of the court over what information parties may present. As Professor Damaska
explains, "Anglo-American criteria of relevancy make the factual basis of a
decision closer to social reality, where fact and value are intertwined." 1 In an
adversarial system, truth is more a matter of perspective than in the inquisito-
rial system, and the court controls the flow of information presented by the
parties as a way of controlling social conflict.72
Federal Rule of Evidence 702). Engineering testimony was at issue in Kumho Tire. Id. at 137.
64. See id. at 148 (finding that courts do not limit the Daubert rationale to "scientific"
knowledge).
65. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (incorporating Daubert's language).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Norwood, 939 F. Supp. 1132,1134 (D.N.J. 1996) (applying
the Daubert test).
67. See, e.g., Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 705 A.2d 1314, 1323 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1997) (reviewing expert testimony under the Frye standard and addressing scientific validity).
68. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (finding that the
gatekeeping function applies to all experts because Daubert's focus was on the relevance of the
testimony, not its scientific nature).
69. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (characterizing the
inquiry as a "flexible one").
70. Id. at 593-94.
71. Mirian Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Facifinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1083,1104 (1975).
72. See id. at 1105 (contrasting the adversary and inquisitorial systems of adjudication).
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The profession has overwhelmingly castigated future dangerousness
testimony based on clinical judgment alone (and so it fails the peer review,
publication, and general acceptance prongs of Daubert). Because such
predictions are wrong more often than right, they cannot meet the error rate
inquiry." Thus, it is plain that the future dangerousness testimony in Bare-
foot, which was based neither on scientific study nor on personal medical
diagnosis, and did not even purport to be based on the scientific method,
cannot meet criteria for valid science.
Indeed, the basis for the Supreme Court finding future dangerousness
testimony admissible was that even a lay person could testify to future danger-
ousness.74 Unlike the lay persons involved, however, these experts had no
personal knowledge of the defendant.75 The Barefoot experts based their
testimony entirely on the defendant's conduct at trial and the facts of the
crimes, as most such experts still do in Texas. This basis was enough, accord-
ing to one of the experts, to demonstrate future dangerousness with "one
hundred percent" accuracy.76 That statement alone was enough to make his
testimony unreliable.77
One of the reasons for permitting all relevant evidence into a sentencing
hearing, regardless of whether it can meet the rules of evidence (provided that
it is sufficiently reliable), is to assist the jury in making an individualized
determination of whether the death penalty is appropriate under the particular
circumstances of this defendant. That is similar to the issue of "fit," which the
Daubert Court explained concerns whether otherwise valid testimony will
actually assist the factfinder.7 s The Court pointed out in Joiner that conclu-
73. Although they made bald assertions that they were invariably accurate, the experts in
Barefoot offered no substantiation for their claims. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,
918-19 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (recounting the doctor's claims and the lack of
substantiation from the trial).
74. See id. at 896-97 (relying on precedent that allowed lay persons to judge future
dangerousness).
75. See id. at 917 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that neither doctor ever personally
examined Barefoot).
76. Id. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis deleted).
77. No one can testify with "one hundred percent" accuracy. In addition, this expert had
no empirical data to support his highly improbable statement. Such hyperbole by experts is by
no means uncommon. A Texas psychiatrist, who by 1992 had participated in 144 capital cases,
testified in each of them that he was, with medical and scientific certainty, sure that the defen-
dant would kill again. See Joseph T. McCann, Standards for Expert Testimony in New York
Death Penalty Cases, 68 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 30, 30 (1996) (outlining the prevalence of improper
assessments of future dangerousness). One of those condemned was later found to be innocent
of the crime. Id. at 32.
78. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993).
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sions and methodology must have a valid connection." Thus, unless an expert
can demonstrate sound methodology and scientific reasoning, no opinion
testimony is admissible. If testimony is without foundation-that is, if
testimony purporting to be scientific is based on the expert's ipse dixit-it
cannot meet due process requirements of relevance and reliability. Nonethe-
less, the argument that future dangerousness testimony is inherently unreliable
has been remarkably unsuccessful.s" The overwhelming majority of courts
that have addressed the issue since Barefoot have simply found its constitu-
tionality beyond question. For example, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
in 1998, addressing the scientific validity of future dangerousness testimony,
found it to be sufficiently reliable."'
But a few muted stirrings of unease have occurred. For example, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the issue of whether
Daubert implicitly overruled Barefoot, although it declined to reach that issue
in Tigner v. Cockrell. 2 In addition, concurring in the Fifth Circuit's per
curiam opinion in Flores v. Johnson,3 Judge Garza excoriated the Texas
courts' use of expert future dangerousness testimony (but found himself
bound nonetheless by Barefoot).4
In Flores, Judge Garza discussed in detail the psychological testimony
used in Texas courts to support future dangerousness. The expert who testified
in Flores, Dr. Griffith, was "frequently the state's star witness" and had never
testified that a defendant did not pose a future danger.85 Judge Garza observed
that it is still as true today as it was in Barefoot's time that "[n]either the Court
nor the State of Texas has cited a single reputable scientific source contradict-
ing the unanimous conclusion of professionals in this field that psychiatric
predictions of long-term future violence are wrong more often than they are
79. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146-47 (1997) (discussing the link
between conclusions and methodology).
80. See WEBsTER ET AL., supra note 35, at 17-21 (observing that the political and legal
pressures on experts to predict violence in the United States and Canada are overwhelming).
81. See Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (construing the
Texas rules of evidence, which require a similar inquiry to that of Daubert), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). "When addressing fields
of study aside from the hard sciences, such as the social sciences or fields that are based
primarily upon experience and training as opposed to the scientific method, [the] requirement
of reliability applies but with less rigor than to the hard sciences." Id. at 561.
82. See Tigner v. Cockrell, 264 F.3d 521, 526-27 (5th Cir. 2001) (dismissing the case
because a decision on collateral review would have violated the non-retroactivity principle).
83. Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
84. See id. at 464 (Garza, J., concurring) (castigating the "inadequacy of the science"
behind expert future dangerousness testimony).
85. Id. at 462 (Garza, J., concurring).
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right." 6 Moreover, when considered in juxtaposition with the strict admissi-
bility requirements for most expert testimony--especially in civil trials, in
which the stakes are much lower-Dr. Griffith's testimony became strikingly
inadequate.8 7
The Barefoot decision permitted experts to testify about future danger-
ousness because the state permitted such testimony by lay witnesses. Judge
Garza pointed out that the problem with having an expert rather than a lay
person testifying to future dangerousness is that it gives junk science the
"imprimatur of scientific fact."". Indeed, faced with such testimony, "juries
are almost always persuaded." 9 Although he acknowledged the jury's right
to impose death as an appropriate punishment for a vicious crime, Judge
Garza concluded that '"te legitimacy of our legal process is threatened" by
allowing such testimony into evidence.9 Nonetheless, the court upheld
Flores's death sentence.
The reliability standard articulated in Daubert and its progeny should
apply to future dangerousness evidence. Juries give great credence to expert
testimony, and the scientific literature evaluating the predictive value of
clinical judgments about future violence has shown that these expert predic-
tions are no better than lay judgments. If courts applied Daubert standards to
the kinds of clinical predictions currently offered in our courts, they would not
admit the predictions because they do not meet any of the criteria for scientific
validity. This absence of scientific validity is of heightened concern in the
context of capital sentencing hearings, in which the jury hearing the evidence
might very well impose the death penalty. It seems extraordinarily anomalous
that courts should require more to demonstrate relevance and reliability in
civil cases than in criminal cases.
86. Id. (Oarza, J., concurring) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 920 (1983)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
87. Id. at 464 (Oarza, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 466 (Garza, J., concurring). Judge Garza opined that admitting a psychiatric
prediction of dangerousness was akin to permitting a phrenologist-the example that Justice
Stevens used in Joiner of junk science-to testify that the bumps on a defendant's skull could
predict dangerousness. Id. at 465 n.12 (Garza, J., concurring) (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136, 153 n.6 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring)). Judge Garza noted that "the phrenolo-
gists' testimony appears no less scientific." Id. (Garza, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 466 (Garza, J., concurring). The Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged in
the Flores case that it was, with only one exception, unable to find the evidence insufficient in
any case in which an expert had testified that the defendant posed a future danger. Flores v.
State, 871 S.W.2d 714, 717 & n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en bane).
90. Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 470 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, J., concurring).
60 WASH. &LEE L. REV 353 (2003)
IV Evidentiary Federalism and Due Process in Death Penalty Proceedings
Even if admitting clinical predictions into testimony violates rules of
evidence, federal courts will not hear claims of state law violations unless the
state law violations amount to violations of the federal Constitution.9' Ques-
tions of evidence law in state courts are state law questions, and courts do not
usually grant habeas relief for failure to follow the state evidentiary rules?9
91. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,67-68 (1991) (finding that "it is not the province
of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state-law questions").
92. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1967) ("[T]he Due Process Clause
guarantees the fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial. But it has never been
thought that such cases establish this Court as a rule-making organ for the promulgation of state
rules of criminal procedure." (citations omitted)). Moreover, evidentiary rules do not necessar-
ily apply at sentencing hearings. Federal Rule of Evidence I 101(dX3) states that the rules do
not apply to sentencing proceedings, so federal courts do not apply them. The states are divided
about their application. See Robert A. Kelly, Applicability of the Rules of Evidence to the
Capital Sentencing Proceeding: Theoretical & Practical Support for Open Admissibility of
Mitigating Information, 60 UMKC L. REV. 411, 457 (1992) (analyzing capital sentencing
statutes and concluding that nineteen states do not apply the rules of evidence and that seven-
teen states use evidentiary rules for at least part of their sentencing proceedings, but that all
thirty-six states require that any evidence admitted be relevant and probative). Nonetheless, all
states invoking the death penalty provide that any evidence admitted be both relevant and
material. See id. (stating that for evidence to be relevant and probative--as all death penalty
states require--evidence must be "logically relevant, legally relevant, and offered for the
purpose of proving or supporting a material proposition"); see also U.S. SENENCING GUIDE-
INES MANUAL § 6A1.3 ("In resolving any dispute concerning a factor important to the sentenc-
ing determination, the court may consider relevant information without regard to its admissibil-
ity under the rules of evidence applicable at tral .... ."); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(d) (1994)
(providing that "[a]ny evidence which has probative value and is relevant to sentence shall be
received at the sentence hearing regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of
evidence"). Hearsay, for example, is frequently admissible in sentencing hearings. See, e.g.,
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,251 (1949) (noting the different evidentiary standards for
sentencing); Todd v. Schomig, 283 F.3d 842, 853 (7th Cir. 2002) (allowing hearsay evidence
in sentencing phase). Testimony about unadjudicated prior offenses is also allowed. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lee, 274 F.3d 485, 494 (8th Cir. 2001) (allowing evidence of unadjudicated
prior offenses); Gilbert v. State, 951 P.2d 98, 122 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997) (same). Nonethe-
less, both hearsay and unadjudicated offenses must have "indicia of reliability" and relevance
to be admissible, even at sentencing hearings. See Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 163
(1992) (finding evidence presented at sentencing hearing that the convicted murderer was a
member of the Aryan Brotherhood irrelevant); United States v. Huckins, 53 F.3d 276, 279-80
(9th Cir. 1995) (finding that hearsay, to be admissible at sentencing, must have some other
corroboration). The floor of relevance and materiality, in the context of science, is that the
testimony reflect valid science. Although the Supreme Court in Daubert addressed the admissi-
bility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, it based its reasoning on
concepts of relevance and probative value, which it linked to the requirement that the evidence
assist the jury. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993) (stating that
assisting the trier of fact "goes primarily to relevance").
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In Estelle v. McGuire,93 for example, the Supreme Court found that it had
been error to grant habeas relief on the basis of admitted battered child
syndrome evidence introduced to prove intent in the trial of a father for
murdering his six-month-old daughter." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit granted habeas based on its holding that this evidence was
"incorrectly admitted ... pursuant to California law"'95 and that in conjunction
with an instruction about the use of prior act evidence, it amounted to a due
process violation.' Because the prosecution proffered the evidence to show
that the injuries were not accidental, but instead were a product of child abuse,
the Supreme Court held that the evidence of prior injuries was relevant to
show intent, even if it did not purport to show who caused the injuriesY The
Court noted that "nothing in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires the State to refrain from introducing relevant evidence
simply because the defense chooses not to contest the point" (the defense did
not contest that somebody had abused the baby)."
The only evidentiary question that the habeas court may review is whether
the evidence "so infected" the proceeding that it resulted in the violation of a
constitutional right." The Court held that neither the battered child syndrome
evidence nor the instruction as to its use amounted to such a violation because
the evidence was relevant to intent, served to narrow the possible perpetrators,
and was consistent with "the familiar use of evidence of prior acts for the
purpose of showing intent, identity, motive or plan."'" Thus, the framework
that the Court established is that a mere violation of state evidentiary rules will
not be sufficient for federal relief, some constitutional violation must have
occurred.101
The flip side toMcGuire, however, is that the failure to meet the threshold
standards of relevance and reliability in expert testimony is no mere state law
failure, but a constitutional error. Notably, no one contested the scientific
validity of the testimony in McGuire. Rather, the dispute was over its rele-
vance for proving intent, and the Supreme Court found it to be relevant to that
93. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991).
94. Id. at 67.
95. Id. (quoting Mcuire v. Estelle, 902 F.2d 749, 754 (9th Cir. 1990)).
96. Id. at 66-67.
97. Id. at 68.
98. Id. at 70.
99. Id. at 72.
100. Id. at 75 (citing FED. R. EVID. 404(b)).
101. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422,438 n.6 (1983) ("[T]he Due Process Clause
does not permit the federal courts to engage in a finely tuned review of the wisdom of state
evidentiary rules .... ").
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issue. But the issue of expert future dangerousness testimony poses a rele-
vance issue at a threshold due process level. That is, if the expert testimony
about future dangerousness were scientifically valid, it would unquestionably
be relevant to the reasoned moral inquiry about retribution for the defendant.
Cross-examination could expose any weaknesses. But if the expert testimony
has no basis in reality, if it is not grounded in science, then it is wholly irrele-
vant to the jury's task, and its admission is arbitrary.'"
Imposing the ultimate sentence ought not to be arbitrary."°3 Throughout
its death penalty jurisprudence, the Court has maintained that "there is a
significant constitutional difference between the death penalty and lesser
punishments.'0 4 In Furman v. Georgia,"° the Supreme Court found that the
imposition of the death penalty in three cases violated the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments as "cruel and unusual punishment.' 06 In a subsequent
series of cases, the Court reinstated the death penalty, as long as the authorizing
legislation guided discretion in its imposition." 7
In its more recent cases, the Supreme Court has defined two important
Eighth Amendment principles in its death penalty jurisprudence: individual-
ized sentencing and eliminating arbitrariness through channeled discretion."
The "evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposition of death sentences under
102. Cf Logerquist v. McVey, I P.3d 113, 115 (Ariz. 2000) (finding that although neither
Daubert nor Frye applied to the admissibility of expert testimony, the offering party still must
establish scientific validity for the evidence to meet the threshold reliability and relevance
standards).
103. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (explaining that "discretion must be
suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action"); see also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (finding that a Texas statutory
scheme for imposing the death penalty is rational and therefore constitutional).
104. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625,637 (1980) (plurality opinion).
105. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
106. Id. at 239-40.
107. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (stating that "discretion must be suitably directed and
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action"); Jurek, 428 U.S.
at 276 (finding that a state statutory scheme for imposing the death penalty is rational and
therefore constitutional); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259-60 (1976) (same).
108. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (prohibiting the preclusion of, "as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances
of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death"); see also
Kirchmeier, supra note 21, at 346 (observing that the Supreme Court, in its struggle to create
a fair system, "has rejected both mandatory death penalty schemes and schemes that give total
unbridled discretion to the sentencer"). But see Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (advocating a mandatory death penalty scheme because "to refer to the
two lines as pursuing 'twin objectives,' . .. is rather like referring to the twin objectives of good
and evil. They cannot be reconciled." (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,459 (1984))).
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law" was the goal.' In making its decision, the sentencing body must reach
"a reasoned moral response" free of impediments to relevant sentencing
considerations. 0 Expert testimony that purports to do what it cannot do would
appear to be precisely such an impediment.
Not only the Eighth Amendment, but also the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment mandates that the sentencing body make determina-
tions in a manner that is not "arbitrary and capricious."' " Because many ofthe
rights given at trial do not apply at sentencing, due process is the primary
source of regulation." 2 Due process governs the right to accurate informa-
tion." 3 In Gregg v. Georgia,"4 the Court warned that "accurate sentencing
information is an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned determination of
whether a defendant shall live or die by a jury of people who may never before
have made a sentencing decision.""' Moreover, because of the severity of the
sanction, courts must handle the imposition of death in a way that permits a
defendant to present whatever facts might impel a jury to mercy." 6
Fundamental fairness, the freestanding content of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, poses the question of whether the procedure subjects the defendant to an
109. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,276 (1976).
110. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987).
111. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) ("[Wlhere discretion is afforded a
sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be
taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk
of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."). This due process right, sometimes called "free-
standing due process" because it stands apart from the Bill of Rights, is a procedure "necessary
to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 n. 14
(1968). For a discussion of the jurisprudence of free-standing due process in the Supreme
Court, see generally Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and CriminalProcedure: The
Supreme Court's Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 303 (2001).
112. See Israel, supra note 111, at 393 (observing that at "the sentencing stage, most trial-
type rights (e.g., confrontation) do not apply and due process becomes the primary source of
constitutional regulation").
113. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,245"52 (1949) (finding that due process
allows a judge to consider out-of-court sources of information during sentencing).
114. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
115. Id. at 190. Along with its two companion cases, Proffi t v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976) (plurality opinion), and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion), the
Supreme Court authorized the states to return to capital punishment in Gregg.
116. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) ("Given that the imposition of death
by public authority is so profoundly different from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the
conclusion that an individualized decision is essential in capital cases... [and that] treating
each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual
is far more important than in noncapital cases.").
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unacceptably high risk of erroneous decisions.' In the criminal context,
however, due process proscribes only those state procedures that "offend[]
some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental." '11 Thus, in determining whether the
future dangerousness testimony implicated a fundamental right, the Court has
looked to principles having "deep roots" in our heritage.
119
A requirement of "deep roots" does not limit due process to historical
practices, however. Instead, it requires adherence to basic rule-of-law princi-
ples. For example, in rejecting a state position that put the decision about
lineup reliability to the jury, the Supreme Court held that a substantial likeli-
hood of misidentification precluded the admission of lineup identification
evidence as a violation of due process, even without reference to common law
traditions or contemporary consensus. 2 ' Two major due process concerns are
apparent with respect to expert testimony in capital sentencing: it really
matters that the facts presented by experts are accurate, and the jury should
have access to all of the accurate facts that might help it reach a reasoned moral
decision.'
The Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence since Furman v. Geor-
gia has focused on balancing consistency in decisionmaking with individual
117. See, e.g., Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (finding that due process and
compulsory process analyses require the admission of reliable exculpatory defense evidence
regarding the credibility of a confession); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 669 (1985)
(stating that disclosure of exculpatory evidence is required under due process (citing Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87 (1963))); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,84 (1985) (stating that due
process requires a state to provide an expert for the defense under certain circumstances); Foster
v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443 (1969) (excluding suggestive lineup on due process grounds);
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963) (upholding a constitutional due process right
to a change in venue to protect the defendant from local prejudice); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S.
264, 269 (1959) (finding that due process prohibits the prosecution's knowing use of perjured
testimony); see also Israel, supra note 111, at 386 (discussing the role of subjectivity in the
application of the fundamental fairness standard).
118. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437,445 (1992) (quoting Patterson v. New Jersey, 432
U.S. 197,201-02 (1977)).
119. Id. at 446 ("The rule that a criminal defendant who is incompetent should not be
required to stand trial has deep roots in our common-law heritage.").
120. In three important cases decided on the same day, the Supreme Court determined that
eyewitness identification is unreliable and therefore that the right to counsel attached. The cases
were Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 268 (1967); and
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). See Israel, supra note 111, at 417 (noting a
number of Supreme Court free-standing due process decisions that addressed neither historical
practice nor contemporary consensus).
121. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 (discussing the need for individualized sentences in
capital cases).
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fairness."z The Supreme Court set the minimal standard for imposing the
death penalty as "the evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposition of death
sentences under law." '123 Practices that threaten the reliability ofthe sentencing
procedure cannot fall within such a framework. Permitting experts to testify
without scientific bases for their assertions is thus inimical to due process
standards. Admissibility of scientific evidence should depend upon its rele-
vance and reliability. The unresolvable problem of clinical predictions of
future dangerousness is that they have no scientific basis. Admitting expert
testimony that has no scientific basis is misleading to the jury and thus pre-
cludes rational decisionmaking.
If a state's procedure precludes reliable, rational decisionmaking, it
violates due process. 24 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides a right to fundamentally fair proceedings, and a relevance requirement
is an integral part of a fair and rational proceeding.'25 The requirement of
fundamental fairness encompasses a requirement of rationality, so that the state
may not present the jury with inaccurate or misleading evidence. 26 Because
122. See Jonathan R. Sorensen & Rocky L. Pilgrim, An Actuarial Risk Assessment of
Violence Posed by Capital Murder Defendants, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1251, 1251
(2000) ("[Djath penalty jurisprudence has focused on how to insure consistency in decision-
making while providing fairness to individual defendants.").
123. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,276 (1976).
124. Notably, the Supreme Court announced a three-part balancing test in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976): consideration of the private interest that state action would
affect, risk of erroneously depriving someone of that interest through the procedures used, and
the government's interest (including fiscal and administrative burdens imposed). Id. at 334-35.
In Medina v. California, however, it declined to apply such a balancing test to state procedural
rules that are part of criminal procedure because it believed that any expansion of explicit
constitutional guarantees "invites undue interference with both considered legislative judgments
and the careful balance the Constitution strikes between liberty and order." Medina v. Califor-
nia, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992). However, as Jerold Israel explains, Mathews's concept of free-
standing due process has purpose not so much in balancing, but in looking at the "logical
implications of a basic principle of fairness." Israel, supra note 111, at 423. Permitting expert
testimony that borders on the fraudulent can do little other than undermine these basic princi-
ples. Israel suggests that one can interpret the Court's fundamental fairness jurisprudence in
four ways: (1) insistence on "a few basic elements of trial-type adjudication" with the addition
of "a wide variety of rational procedures"; (2) assuring that the process does not convict the
innocent; (3) giving the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights preemptive influence;
(4) giving the basic procedural protection of the common law with the addition of a cost-benefit
analysis. Id. at 425.
125. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (stating that the Due Process
Clause provides a right to relief when a proceeding is "fundamentally unfair"); Lankford v.
Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 121 (1991) (finding that the Clause represents a profound attitude of
fairness between the individual and the government).
126. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (upholding military rule
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testimony that is without scientific merit is inimical to rational decisionmaking,
a state process permitting such testimony undermines the fundamental fairness
of the proceeding. 12
7
The due process concern was paramount in the Supreme Court's ruling in
Simmons v. South Carolina,"r in which the Court held that the sentencing jury
was entitled to be accurately informed of their state's alternative to the death
penalty. 29 The Simmons Court acknowledged the primacy of future danger-
ousness to sentencing decisions and emphasized how the lack of information
about eligibility for parole could skew the sentencing decision. 3 ° This primacy
of future dangerousness to the sentencing determina-tion-ninety-five percent
of death sentencing jurors believe that the evidence showed that the defendant
posed a threat to society"'-similarly mandates that expert testimony prof-
fered to establish future dangerousness must be accurate. 32 The premise that
the jury is entitled to accurate information in reaching its decision would
appear counter to the Court's refusal to exclude misleading testimony in
Barefoot. If expert testimony is inaccurate, as it is in clinical predictions of
future dangerousness, then it does not meet the indispensable prerequisite of
providing the jury with accurate information.
excluding polygraph evidence as a rational interest in eliminating unreliable evidence); Caldwell
v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340 (1985) (finding the prosecution's argument at sentencing that
a juror's decision was reviewable unconstitutional because it was both inaccurate and mislead-
ing); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300 (1973) (holding hearsay evidence admissible
because the statements had "considerable assurance of their reliability"); Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967) (addressing the defendant's right to present witnesses and finding a rule
of exclusion arbitrary if it had no rational basis).
127. Fundamental fairness is infrequently invoked by the Supreme Court and, when
invoked, is generally without explanation. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825
(1991) (noting that the Due Process Clause provides relief when the introduction of evi-
dence--there, victim impact evidence--makes the trial "fundamentally unfair"); Lassiter v.
Dept. of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981) (fundamental fairness is "a requirement whose
meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty").
128. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (plurality opinion).
129. See id. at 169 (observing that "parole was a mainstay" in most states and that "most
juries lack accurate information about the precise meaning of 'life imprisonment'").
130. Id. at 163 (noting that "it is entirely reasonable for a sentencing jury to view a
defendant who is eligible for parole as a greater threat to society than a defendant who is not").
131. See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confuion: Juror Instructions
in Capital Cases, 79 CoRNELL L. REv. 1,6 (1993) (cited by the plurality opinion in Simmons).
132. See, e.g., Stephen P. Oarvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What
Do Jurors Think?, 98 COUAM. L. REV. 1538, 1560 (1998) (reporting on research data demon-
strating the "pervasive role future dangerousness plays in and on the minds of capital sentencing
jurors").
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V Gatekeeping and Capital Sentencing
A. Capital Sentencing Proceedings
The excuse for the courts' refusal to scrutinize expert testimony at
sentencing is that the rules of evidence do not generally apply. The reason
that the rules of evidence do not generally apply at sentencing proceedings is
that sentencing proceedings historically are nonadversarial"' In the pre-
sentencing guidelines era, the judge had access to a wide variety of informa-
tion and had discretion in imposing sentences within statutory prescriptions.
Although the federal and states' guideline regimes have narrowed judicial
discretion somewhat, the norm remains judicial access to a wide variety of
background material. This structure makes ordinary sentencing similar to the
European inquisitorial system of adjudication, in which the judge has access
to the defendant's file, both parties may present their views, but only the judge
directs the investigation and questions the witnesses. 3 4 Under such a regime,
little concern for rules of evidence exists-the judge is presumed to rely only
on relevant information. The idea of gatekeeping is therefore unnecessary,
and the continental view of relevance is very technical and precise."' On the
other hand, in the adversarial mode, it is the parties who control, initially at
least, what information will be available to decisionmakers, and judicial
gatekeeping ensures that the proceedings do not degenerate into a show that
will mislead the jury from its mission and that the details that the litigants
present have some propensity to bring out the truth."6
Capital sentencing is different from other criminal sentencing. Following
a constitutionally mandated bifurcated trial,'37 a jury performs the capital
sentencing.'38 A common justification for declining to apply the rules of
133. Supra note 92.
134. See Damaska, supra note 71, at 1083-1106 (contrasting the adversarial and inquisito-
rial systems of adjudication). In an inquisitorial system, the prosecution and the defense do not
have separate witnesses, and it is the judge's responsibility to question the witnesses and inquire
into the record. Id. Of course, in practice, there are no purely inquisitorial or purely adversarial
systems; both borrow from each other. See MIRJAN DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND
STATE AUTHoRrrY: ACOMPARATIVEAPPROACHTO THE LEGAL PROCESS 241 (1986) (explain-
ing that as "applied to existing systems, most of them were found to be pastiches").
135. See Damaska, supra note 71, at 1104-05 ("The continental system would tend to
embrace a paradigm closer to that of scientific investigation.").
136. See id. at 1090-91 (describing the adversarial mode of proof-taking).
137. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (mandating bifurcated trials to accommo-
date the need for both guided discretion and "individualized consideration" in capital sentenc-
ing).
138. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (ruling that the capital sentencing
decision must be made by a jury).
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evidence strictly at sentencing is that such proceedings have become a search
for justice rather than truth. As the Supreme Court held in Lockett v. Ohio,13 9
the evidentiary standards in the sentencing phase are fairly open because "any
aspect [of the defendant's] character or record and any of the circumstances
of the offense" ought to be available to support a sentence less than death. 40
The importance of accuracy, however, in the context of what is an unabash-
edly adversarial proceeding, demands some control over what counts as facts
in the proceeding.
Thus, the jury's "reasoned moral response" to the evidence and argu-
ments at sentencing, according to the Supreme Court, must have a basis in
information sufficient and relevant for reliable, rational decisionmaking. 4'
At capital sentencing hearings, both prosecution and defense present testi-
mony and argument. Expert testimony is prevalent. 4 2 Without formal re-
quirements of evidentiary rules, virtually no structured examination of the
scientific basis for such testimony exists. Despite its adversarial character,
judges frequently believe that they are not bound to exercise gatekeeping
duties. As a result, the courts exercise gatekeeping functions in sporadic and
apparently arbitrary ways.
B. Future Dangerousness Testimony in Capital Sentencing
Both state and federal courts are lackadaisical about gatekeeping when
it comes to capital sentencing." 3  The Federal Rules of Evidence-which
139. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
140. Id. at 604 (plurality opinion).
141. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (explaining that "the sentence imposed
at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant's background,
character, and crime" (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987))).
142. Parties frequently offer expert testimony at capital sentencing proceedings. For
example, in the Capital Jury Project, funded by the National Science Foundation, the California
portion of the study examined thirty-six death penalty cases and found that the prosecution
called an expert in eighty-one percent of the cases, and the defense called an expert in ninety
percent. Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries
Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1120 (1997) (noting that "conven-
tional practice at the penalty phase involves presenting an expert to the jury at some point-in
many cases more than one-who will testify based upon an expertise gained through training
and study").
143. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 significantly expanded
the scope of federal capital crimes. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); see Charles
K. Eldred, Recent Developments, The New Federal Death Penalties, 22 AM. J. CRiM. L. 293,
296-98 (1994) (listing sixty capital offenses). But see Robert F. Worth, Prosecutors Oppose
Judge in Ruling on Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMEs, May 27, 2002, at B3 (citing opinion by Judge
Jed Rakoff stating that the death penalty posed "an undue risk that a meaningful number of
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include the Daubert standard for expert witnesses-do not apply at federal
capital sentencing proceedings, 44 despite the Supreme Court's recognition
that capital sentencing requires a "heightened reliability" standard.14 None-
theless, by statute, only relevant evidence is admissible,146 and as under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, if the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs its
probative value, courts may exclude even relevant evidence. 1 ' Thus, even if
the federal rules do not apply directly, some scientific validity inquiry ought
to apply.
The courts occasionally recognize this tension between heightened
reliability for death sentencing proceedings and the inapplicability of eviden-
tiary rules by at least referring to a scientific validity inquiry, even though the
court declines to reach the Daubert issue. For example, in United States v.
Barnette," the court disposed of prosecution arguments that the federal rules
do not apply at sentencing and found that the contested future dangerousness
evidence met Daubert standards.1" 9 The defense argued that prosecution
psychiatric testimony predicting dangerousness based on an actuarial instru-
ment, the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R), did not meet
Daubert standards of reliable scientific evidence.5 ° The defense argued that
three of the PCL-R checklist factors were impermissible: race, poverty, and
innocent persons" were being executed); Thomas F. Liotti, Criminal Justice System in Crisis,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 21, 2003, at S5 (noting "Judge Jed Rakoff's courageous recent decision declaring
the federal death penalty unconstitutional"). Even in federal cases, however, courts do not
generally invoke Daubert at sentencing because the rules of evidence do not apply. See, e.g.,
U.S. SENTENCINGGUIDINS MANUAL § 6A1.3(a) (2002)("In resolving any dispute concerning
a factor important to the sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant information
without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial ... ."); ALA.
CODE § 13A-5-45(d) (1994) (providing that "[a]ny evidence which has probative value and is
relevant to sentence shall be received at the sentence hearing regardless of its admissibility
under the exclusionary rules of evidence").
144. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000) ("[I]nformation is admissible regardless of its
admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials.").
145. See 21 U.S.C. § 8480) (2000) (allowing the presentation of aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors at sentencing); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,411 (1986) (setting a "heightened
standard of reliability" for capital sentencing).
146. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000) (stating that "information may be presented as to any
matter relevant to the sentence").
147. Id. § 3593(a) (analogous to FED. R. EVID. 403).
148. United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803 (4th Cir. 2000).
149. Id. at 815-16 (concluding, in response to government arguments that "Daubert does
not apply to the sentencing phase of a capital trial," that the court "need not address whether
Daubert applies to sentencing hearings, because, even assuming that it does, we find the
evidence meets its standards for admissibility").
150. Id.
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age.151 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the defense did not
contest relevancy and found that the defense objections to reliability were
based on only two publications by the defense expert.152 The court held that
this basis was insufficient to overturn the trial judge's reliability determina-
tion. 53 The court distinguished the holding in United States v. Powers"54
because there the proponent of the testimony could not rebut the showing of
unreliability 5 5 and in contrast, "Barnette only proffered two articles written
by his expert."'56 Although the court acknowledged that the PCL-R did use the
three impermissible factors, the court found that the expert had not relied on
them exclusively, but also on seventeen other PCL-R factors, the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition (DSM-1V), personal observations, and
research on predicting future dangerousness."5 7
Similarly, in United States v. Lee,5 8 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit upheld the admissibility of the prosecution expert's psychologi-
cal testimony that the defendant showed no remorse, without discussing
scientific validity.'59 In Lee, the court held that the defense had opened the
door by presenting psychological testimony in mitigation.1" Although the
prosecution expert exceeded the scope of direct testimony, the court held that
the statement "fell within the wide boundaries set for the admission of evi-
dence at capital sentencing hearings" and was therefore admissible.' 6' Worse,
the defense's psychological expert opened the door to testimony about
unadjudicated prior offenses, such as various assaults, which the court not
only held were probative of fiture dangerousness, but also impeached the
testimony of the defense expert. 62 As a result of these findings, the Eighth
Circuit overturned the district court's order for a new penalty phase hearing. 63
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See id. (finding that the trial court's examination of the issue did not support a finding
of abuse of discretion).
154. United States v. Powers, 59 F.3d 1460, 1471 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that the penile
plethysmograph test failed to meet scientific validity standards and was therefore inadmissible).
155. Id.
156. United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 816(4th Cir. 2000).
157. Id
158. United States v. Lee, 274 F.3d 485 (8th Cir. 2001).
159. See id. at 492-95 (discussing admissibility of expert psychological testimony).
160. Id. at 495.
161. Id.
162. See id. ("By introducing a mental health expert in defense, Lee opened the door to
testimony concerning psychological diagnosis.").
163. Id. at497.
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One finds a third example of how the basic evidentiary precepts may
become distorted in death penalty sentencing in United States v. Allen.'"
There, the Eighth Circuit found that the Federal Death Penalty Act, which
permits "information" rather than "evidence" to be admitted at the sentencing
phase, did not violate the Eighth Amendment as inherently unreliable.1
65
"[N]ot only does the statute protect a defendant from both irrelevant informa-
tion and overly prejudicial information, the relaxed evidentiary standard also
works to a defendant's advantage in helping to prove mitigating factors and
to disprove aggravating factors."'' At issue in the case, however, was the
prosecution's reference to the defendant as a "murderous dog" in arguing
future dangerousness at closing. 67 The court found this argument to be
improper but not so unduly prejudicial as to violate the defendant's due
process rights to fair sentencing."
Even without expert predictions, fiture dangerousness may become an
issue when the prosecution attempts to demonstrate future dangerousness by
showing that the defendant has a past criminal history.' This past conduct
frequently comes into evidence at sentencing through unadjudicated prior
crimes. 7' Although a pattern of previous violence is one of the strongest
predictors of future violence,"' the evidence of such conduct is often flimsy
164. United States v. Allen, 247 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 2001), cert granted and judgment





169. See, e.g., Gilliard v. Scroggy, 847 F.2d 1141, 1147 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding that a
statutory aggravating factor allowing the jury to consider past convictions for violent offenses
"implicitly" posed a future dangerousness inquiry).
170. It is a common practice at sentencing for the prosecution to introduce evidence that
the defendant committed other crimes that were never tried. See Steven Paul Smith, Note,
Unreliable and Prejudicial: The Use of Extraneous Unadjudicated Offenses in the Penalty
Phase of Capital Trials, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1249, 1250 (1993) (observing that "states have
adopted diverse and inconsistent approaches" and that the circuit courts disagree on the
constitutionality of this evidence). The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of basing
the sentence on a presentencing investigative report without disclosing it to the defendant in
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). Because the defendant had no opportunity to deny
or explain the contents, the Court held the evidence to be so unduly preudicial that it rendered
the trial fundamentally unfair. Id. at 362.
171. See BENCHBOOK, supra note 34, at 223 ("A history of past violence repeatedly has
been shown to be one of the best predictors of violence."); Deidre Klassen & William A.
O'Connor, A Prospective Study of Predictors of Violence in Adult Male Mental Health
Admissions, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 143, 151 tbl.1 (1988) (finding that a prior history of
violent crime associated strongly with post-release arrests in studies of men released from
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at best, and jurors fallaciously equate crime with violence."' In response to
the unreliability of such evidence, some courts require a showing of sufficient
indicia of reliability so that introducing the evidence does not make the
sentencing hearing fundamentally unfair.
For example, in considering the constitutional implications of admitting
evidence of prior unadjudicated offenses to prove future dangerousness, the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia recognized a height-
ened reliability standard for capital sentencing and stated that the court,
although not bound to observe the rules of evidence regarding admissibility,
should not permit "an evidentiary free-for-all that undermines reliability.""'
As a result, the court required a hearing outside the presence of the jury to
determine the reliability of the evidence of the unadjudicated prior offenses.' 7 4
Courts should require a similar approach to expert testimony-a Daubert-like
hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine scientific validity of the
expert testimony-to meet constitutional demands for relevance and reliability
of future violence predictions. I
C. Gatekeeping, Epistemic Norms, and Jury Decisionmaking
Apart from the constitutional and rule-of-law due process concerns, there
remains the question of why we need gatekeepers. Epistemology-the study
of the acquisition of knowledge--has important bearing on this question.
Evidence rules, or the lack of them, determine what knowledge the jury will
be able to use in its determination.175 From an epistemic vantage point, the
question of whether we need judges to act as gatekeepers focuses on whether
psychiatric hospital).
172. Notably, a single past violent act is not enough to form a pattern. Moreover, relying
on past criminal charges poses a severe problem both with respect to false positives (the charge
may not reflect actual conduct but only reports of conduct) and false negatives (charges may be
absent in the presence of some behaviors such as stalking and domestic violence). See, e.g.,
Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal
Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1430 (2001) (arguing against three-strikes laws). Moreover,
although a pattern of violence is predictive of future violence, a pattern of crime is not.
173. United States v. Beckford, 964 F. Supp. 993, 1002 (E.D. Va. 1997).
174. Id. at 1000.
175. Brian Leiter, The Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of
Science Would Not Make for Good Philosophy of Evidence, 1997 BYU L. REV. 803, 805
(explaining that if Frye is wrong, it is for reasons of law, not reasons of science, because the
epistemic norms in science and law are different). I agree with Professor Leiter that the rules
of admissibility need to be evaluated in terms of the goals of law rather than the goals of
science, but I disagree with his conclusion that jurors are as competent as judges in evaluating
junk science. Beecher-Monas, supra note 13, at 75.
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gatekeeping actually promotes the acquisition of knowledge in the context of
a particular social practice, here the capital sentencing hearing. 176
The capital jury makes reasoned moral judgments about the fate of the
defendant-a policy decision. 177 In order to reach a just decision, it is sup-
posed to be provided with "information relevant to the imposition of the
sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of the information.' '17
Truth-accuracy-is a goal of legal policy decisions as well as legal fact
determinations. The purpose of permitting experts-witnesses without
personal knowledge of the defendant or incident-serves the same purpose in
capital sentencing as at trial: to inform the jury about matters outside their
common experience in order to effectuate the truth-seeking goals of the rule
of law. The question is therefore whether initial screening by the judge for
scientific validity aids in this task. The Supreme Court in Barefoot found that
society could rely upon the adversary system to present enough information
to jurors so that they could sort reliable from unreliable expert testimony. The
Daubert Court found that courts needed to screen expert testimony for rele-
vance first. Which was correct? Two lines of research about juror
decisionmaking suggest a framework for analysis.
1. The Story Model
A model of juror decisionmaking proposed by Pennington and Hastie is
the story model, in which the juror's decision depends on how well the ex-
pert's testimony fits with the juror's pre-existing views.'79 Although Penning-
ton and Hastie did not directly apply their framework to expert testimony, they
posited a model consisting of three parts: first, the jurors use their own
preconceptions to weave a story from the evidence that they heard at trial;
second, they take the jury instructions and create verdict alternatives; third,
they attempt to find the best correlation between the story that they con-
176. The question asked by social epistemology is what norms work best under the real
world limits of a particular social practice. See Leiter, supra note 175, at 814-15 (suggesting
two lines of inquiry: "paternalism," whether substituting judicial screening will enable jurors
to make more accurate decisions; and "ought equals can," that is, whether shortcomings in
cognition will preclude either judges or jurors from making an accurate decision).
177. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008 (1983) (stating that the jury, at the
penalty phase, no longer acts strictly as fact finder, rather, the jury's mission involves "a myriad
of factors"); Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 831 n.1 7 (11 th Cir. 1983) (Tjoflat, J., concurring)
("The sentencer, therefore, acts not as fact finder, but as policymaker.").
178. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976).
179. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision
Making, 51 J. PERSONALTY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 242,243-45 (1986) (describing the story model
of decisionmaking). See generally REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983).
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structed and the verdict alternatives.1 80 This model has a number of conse-
quences regarding jury processing of expert testimony regarding future
dangerousness.
Interviews with death penalty jurors demonstrate that connecting the
facts of the case to the proffered expert opinion increases the influence of the
expert opinion on the jury." ' Thus, when an expert opines with certainty in
response to the prosecutor's hypothetical reiteration of the facts of the case,
it is very persuasive story-telling, even though it is the most inaccurate form
of prediction. Not only is the opinion persuasive because of the story-telling
aspect of the hypothetical, but its credibility increases with the strength of
expert certainty. A number of surveys have shown that jurors rated experts
who conveyed low confidence in their opinions as a cause for concern.18 2
Thus, the confidence with which an expert offers his opinion bears a direct
relationship to its credibility with the jury. Evidence that corresponds to
strongly held beliefs is particularly persuasive."8 3 For juries already predis-
posed to believe that a defendant poses a danger to society, a tendency to
overvalue predictions that confirm such beliefs is a likely outcome. 8 4
The adversary process exacerbates these problems. First, in experimental
settings, expert clinical testimony was more persuasive to jurors than actuarial
testimony, even after adversarial manipulations such as effective cross-exami-
180. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 179, at 243-45 (explaining the stages of story
construction, verdict category establishment, and story classification). The story model is
similar to the idea of schemata in psychology. See, e.g., David E. Rumelhart, Schemata and the
Cognitive System, in I HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNTION 161, 163 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. &
Thomas K. Srull eds., 1984). A schema is an "informal, private, unarticulated theory about the
nature of the events, objects, or situations which we face. The total set of schemata we have
available for interpreting our world in a sense constitutes our private theory of the nature of
reality." Id. at 166.
181. Sundby, supra note 142, at 1144 (finding that jurors rated as more influential those
experts who connected the facts of the case to their opinion).
182. See D. Shuman et al., An Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in
the Courts-Part II: A Three-Part Study, 34 JURIMETRIcS J. 193,201 (1994) (finding that 14%
of unfavorable expert witnesses did not appear very knowledgeable).
183. Certainty in witness testimony is especially persuasive when it correlates with strongly
held beliefs. For example, jurors are likely to believe eyewitnesses who testify with certainty,
and jurors are likely to disbelieve expert testimony with an inverse correlation between certainty
and correctness, because jurors who strongly believe that witness confidence in identification
correlates to accuracy tend to discount or ignore the expert. See Krauss & Sales, supra note 16,
at 276 (citing studies); see also Sundby, supra note 142, at 1133 (citing interviews with capital
jurors who found expert testimony about eyewitness evidence incredible because it contradicted
their preconceptions).
184. See C. Walter Showalter & Richard J. Bonnie, Psychiatrists and Capital Sentencing:
Risks and Responsibilities in a Unique Legal Setting, 12 BuLL. AM AcAD. PsYCH. & L. 159,
165 (1984) (jurors tend to overvalue predictions that confirm their beliefs).
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nation and the testimony of a competing expert."' In addition, although
effective cross-examination caused these jurors to re-evaluate the expert
testimony, it had far less effect on clinical opinion testimony than on actuarial
testimony. 86 This result may be because of juror familiarity with (and trust
in) medical diagnoses for common diseases. These clinical predictions of
violence differ from medical diagnoses, however. The best medical diagnosis
requires personal examination and patient history, analyzed against a back-
ground of empirical data about the etiology of the disease that the physician
is diagnosing. These factors are notably absent from clinical predictions of
violence. 87
2. Persuasion Theory and the Impact of Cognitive Quirks
The persuasion theory posits that when an argument is complex or
difficult to understand, people rely on cognitive shortcuts to evaluate the
argument and that expert qualifications then become a surrogate for trustwor-
thiness. '" Studies have shown that juror reliance on expert credentials is
185. See Krauss & Sales, supra note 16, at 291 (discussing the experiment and its results).
186. Id. at 302, 305 (observing that "[ajdversary procedures failed to return mock jurors
who received clinical opinion expert testimony to their initial dangerousness rating levels" and
concluding that jurors have a "predilection for less accurate clinical opinion testimony").
187. Even the most scientific predictions based on thorough examination, diagnosis of
mental symptoms, past patterns of behavior, and probabilistic assessment are wrong nearly as
often as they are right. E.g., Charles W. Lidz et al., The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence
to Others, 269 JAMA 1007 (1993) (concluding that "clinicians are relatively inaccurate predic-
tors of violence"). In this study, when clinicians divided institutionalized men into two groups,
"violent" and "nonviolent," and examined their behavior more than three years later, 53% of the
"violent" group had committed acts of violence, as opposed to 36% of the "nonviolent" group.
Id Random predictions would have a sensitivity and specificity of 50%. Id. at 1009. Thus,
while the results are better than chance, the low sensitivity and specificity of the predictions
show "substantial room for improvement." Id. Sensitivity is "the percentage of times that a test
correctly gives a positive result when the individual tested actually has the characteristic in
question." Bruce R. Parker & Anthony F. Vittoria, Debunking Junk Science: Techniques for
Effective Use of Biostatistics, 66 DEF. CoUNs. J. 33, 34 (1999). Specificity is "the percentage
of times a test correctly reports that a person does not have the characteristic under investiga-
tion." Id. at 34. Actuarial studies, although more accurate than clinical predictions, still predict
with less than stellar accuracy: when participants in the most accurate of the actuarial instru-
ments, the VRAG, "were dichotomized into 'high' and 'low' risk groups, the results indicated
that 55% of the 'high scoring' subjects committed violent recidivism, compared with 19% of
the 'low scoring' group." John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment: Scientific Validity and
Evidentiary Admissibility, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901,908 (2000).
188. See Regina A. Schuller & Neil Vidmar, Battered Wife Syndrome Evidence in the
Courtroom: A Review ofthe Literature, 16 LAW & HUM BEHAV. 273,284 (1992) (stating that
80% of jurors found expert testimony influential).
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directly proportional to the complexity of the information presented.' 89
Moreover, there is some evidence that jurors tend to rank medical expertise
higher than "merely" scientific expertise so that even when the information is
identical, jurors listening to two experts, one a medical doctor and one a
psychologist, find the medical expert more persuasive even though the testi-
mony is identical."9 Nothing suggests that judges are any different from
jurors in this respect, but the kind of structured analysis required under
Daubert counters this tendency by requiring the judge to evaluate the informa-
tion presented.
In addition, there are a number of cognitive quirks-common to every-
one, not just jurors-that may influence the capital sentencing decision.
These quirks result from shortcuts that people use in making judgments in
certain contexts."' People using these heuristics may be behaving rationally
in the sense of conserving time, but forecasts differ from the rational actor
approach of economics.1" Judges also are prone to use these unconscious
shortcuts, but a number of factors counteract this tendency in judges. First,
the structured reasoning process undertaken in a Daubert inquiry improves
performance in cognitive tasks. 93 Second, judges are repeat players in a way
189. Joel Cooper et al., Complex Scientific Testimony: How Do Jurors Make Decisions?,
20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 379,379 (1996).
190. J. Greenberg & A. Wursten, The Psychologist and the Psychiatrist as Expert Wit-
nesses: Perceived Credibility and Influence, 19 PROF. PSYCHOL. RS. & PRAC. 373,378 (1988)
(simulated insanity trial).
191. As Professor Mitchell points out, some people exhibit these quirks more than others
and in some contexts more than others. See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics'
PerfectRationality Should NotBe TradedforBehavioralLaw andEconomics' EqualIncompe-
tence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 73-74 (2002) (explaining that there are "individual and situational
differences in rational behavior" and noting that one should not "assume [a] uniformity in
cognitive performance across persons and situations that is not supported by empirical data").
Nonetheless, the unconscious tendency of most people to take these cognitive shortcuts is well
documented in a number of situations applicable to jury decisionmaking, and understanding
these tendencies and how to counteract them can vastly improve the way that experts present
and juries understand information.
192. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1477-78 (1998).
193. See, e.g., Christopher Jepson et al., Inductive Reasoning: Competence or Skill, 6
BEHAV. & BRAN SCI. 494,498 (1983) (discussing studies indicating that training in reasoning
improves performance dramatically); Richard E. Nisbett et al., Teaching Reasoning, 238 ScL
625, 630 (1987) (advocating formal training in the "rules underlying reasoning"). Training is
much more effective for pragmatic applications of reasoning than for abstract principles. See
Patricia W. Cheng et al., Pragmatic Versus Syntactic Approaches to Training Deductive
Reasoning, in RuLEs FOR REASONING 165, 186 (Richard E. Nisbett ed., 1993) (noting that the
"near total ineffectiveness of purely abstract training in logic contrasts dramatically with the
ready ease with which people seem able to apply a naturally acquired pragmatic reasoning
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that juries are not. Repeat exposure to the decisionmaking task, at least in the
presence of feedback, can improve performance."9 Third, judges are account-
able, at least in some respects; they must present the basis for their decisions,
and that basis is subject to scrutiny and to being overruled by a higher court.
Accountability, which refers to the expectation that one may have to justify
one's actions, 9 ' can improve judgment in the context of competing inferences
from contradictory information.196
a. Processing Limitations
Although brain structure and function limit human memory and attention,
people tend to make inferences as though both were infallible, resulting in
cognitive shortcuts."9  These tendencies are unconscious processes and
doubtless enable people to make decisions that are fast and, on average,
schema" and noting that people "who received a brief training session on the obligation schema
improved markedly on selection problems interpretable in terms of that schema").
194. See, e.g., Jonathan J. Koehler, The Base Rate Fallacy Reconsidered: Descriptive,
Normative andMethodological Challenges, 19 BEHAV. & BRAIN ScL 1, 6 (1986) (citing studies
showing that people learned to use base rates more effectively after receiving feedback about
their errors from their experience (for example physicians who learned the low base rate of
pneumonia from their practice experience relied heavily on the base rate when making diagno-
ses, and auditors "learned and used the base rate for financial statement errors most easily by
directly experiencing those errors"), but cautioning that "personally experienced base rates were
used only by those who also experienced the relationship between the base rate and the
diagnostic information").
195. Jennifer S. Lemer & Philip E. Tetlock, Accountingfor the Effects ofAccountability,
125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255,255 (1999).
196. That is, accountability is effective only if the supervisor can access contrary informa-
tion and disagree with the conclusions drawn. Id. at 258. These researchers note that account-
ability may have complex effects on judgment and that certain conditions must be present in
order for accountability to have a positive effect, principally "an audience (a) whose views are
unknown, (b) who is interested in accuracy, (c) who is interested in processes rather than
specific outcomes, (d) who is reasonably well-informed, and (e) who has a legitimate reason for
inquiring into the reason behind participants' judgments." Id at 259. While the views of
superior courts may be somewhat known, judges have a wider audience consisting of legal
scholars and practitioners to respond to their decisions, even if the judges are not directly
accountable to them; accuracy and the process of judicial inquiry into scientific validity is (or
at least is supposed to be) the focus of the supervising courts, which hopefully are well informed
and which have a legitimate reason for inquiring into the reason behind judicial admissibility
decisions. Thus, accountability is a further reason for structuring the process so that judges
assume gatekeeping responsibilities with respect to expert predictions of dangerousness.
197. See Jeffrey L. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics,
Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CoRNRLL L. REV. 739, 750 (2000) (observing that
"people make inferences based on attention and memory as if these processes are infallible, even
though both are error-prone").
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accurate enough."s It also keeps people from being paralyzed into inaction.'"
Although this ability may confer an evolutionary advantage to humans as a
species, it does not lead to optimal decisionmaking in all situations.2"
For example, rational choice theory predicts that people consider the
statistical probability that an event will occur and update it with particularized
specific information. In fact, however, people ignore base rates"' and overes-
timate the correlation between what something appears to be and what it is,
adhering to stereotypes.2" In other words, they are likely to base decisions on
the extent to which a particular event (or person) resembles a certain category
198. See Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel 0. Ooldstein, Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way:
Models of Bounded Rationality, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 650, 651-55 (1996) (designing and
empirically testing algorithms of bounded rationality against statistically rational algorithms to
solve real world problems of limited knowledge and finding that the statisficing algorithms
scored the highest proportion of correct inferences in the shortest time).
199. See, e.g., SHELLEYE. TAYLOR, POMTs E ILLUSIONS: CREATIVE SELF-DECEPTIONAND
THE HEALTHY MIND 212-14 (1989) (noting that the only people who do not suffer from
overoptimism bias about their chances for success in the future are the clinically depressed).
200. See, e.g., Robyn M. Dawes, Behavioral Decision Making and Judgment, in 1
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 497,497 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) (explain-
ing that if actual decisionmaking violates a certain principle of rationality "systematically (not
just as a result of unreliability or 'error'), this deviation is termed an anomaly--if the people
who violate these principles simultaneously accept them as ones that they believe should govern
their decision making").
201. The base rate is the frequency of a given subject in the population. For example, if
a sample of 100 people consists of 70 lawyers and 30 engineers, the base rate of lawyers is 70%,
and of engineers, 30%. Knowing only that information, if you were asked the occupation of any
given person, you would be wise to answer "lawyer." Interestingly, most people do not. In a
study that divided subjects into two groups, both of which were told that 100 people were either
lawyers or engineers, one subject group was told there were 70 lawyers and 30 engineers, the
other group that there were 30 lawyers and 70 engineers, and both groups were given thumbnail
descriptions of the people written by psychologists, designed to be nondiagnostic with respect
to occupation. Nisbett et al., supra note 193, at 626. In both groups, the subjects based their
answers on stereotypes rather than population base rates. Id. But see Koehler, supra note 194,
at 3 (arguing that it is not so much that base rates are ignored as that "subjects attach relatively
less weight to base rate information than to descriptive, individuating information"). Regardless
of whether subjects ignore base rates or give them insufficient weight, however, when the goal
is accuracy in judgment, structuring a decision process to minimize errors would appear
advantageous. Koehler suggests avoiding the base rate fallacy by explicitly structuring the task
to sensitize decisionmakers to the base rate, presenting the information in relative frequentist
terms, and giving the dcisionmaker cues to base rate diagnosticity, as well as invoking
heuristics that focus on the base rate. Id. at 5. That is precisely what this Article advocates in
requiring judicial .gatekeeping that limits expert prediction testimony to that which explicitly
refers to population base rates.
202. See Einhorn & Hogarth, supra note 33, at 416 (giving the example of a waiter who
gives better service to well-dressed patrons because of a belief that well-dressed patrons leave
better tips, which the patron who leaves a good tip validates).
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of events (or fits within their stereotypes of people). 3 People think by
association and respond to patterns-even infants recognize shape patterns.2°4
This characteristic of human thought undoubtedly speeds up the thinking
process, but it has a downside. For example, in assessing the career of a
person described as overbearing, aggressive, rude, and skilled at rhetorical
argument, people will refer mentally to known stereotypes rather than popula-
tion base rates.20' Thus, in assessing the probability of future violent behavior
for a particular defendant, jurors are unlikely to know, much less refer to, the
probabilities of a recurring incident of violence given that one incident has
already occurred.2° Yet that information is crucial to their task.
203. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 30, at 431 (defining the representativeness
heuristic as evaluating "the probability of an uncertain event, or a sample, by the degree to
which it is: (i) similar in essential properties to its parent population; and (ii) reflects the salient
features of the process by which it is generated" so that it matches a characteristic to a category
and evaluates the probability in terms of the closeness of the match). The classic study on this
bias was that of Meehl and Rosen, who documented the degree to which psychiatric diagnoses
made in staff meetings ignored population base rates. Paul E. Mehl & Albert Rosen, Anteced-
ent Probability and the Efficiency of Psychometric Signs, Patterns, or Cutting Scores, 52
PSYCHOL. BuLL. 194, 216 (1955). A simple example is that "a politician of erect bearing
walking briskly to the podium is likely to be seen as strong and decisive; this is an example of
judgment by representativenesa." Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Reality of
Cognitive Illusions, 103 PSYCHoL REV. 582, 582 (1996).
204. See, e.g., Dawes, supra note 200, at 534 (explaining the problems of representative-
ness and pseudodiagnosticity as probabilistic fallacies); Roger Lecuyer & Christine Cybula,
Categorization of Geometric Figures Composed of Three or Four Elements by 3-Month-Old
Infants, 19 CURRENT PSYCHOL COoNmON 221,221-44 (2000) (noting studies showing that
infants recognize geometric patterns).
205. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Fre-
quencyandProbabiliy, inJUDOMENTUNDERUNcERTADY: HEUisTICS ANDBIASES 163,164
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). Kahneman/Tversky and Oigerenzer maintain an ongoing
debate about whether this is a reasoning error or not, with the focus of the disagreement on
interpretations of probability. See, e.g., Gerd (igerenzer, The Bounded Rationality ofProbabil-
isticMentalModels, in RATIONALiTY: PSYCHOLOOtCALANDPHLOSopHIcALPERmSP E s 284,
291-97 (K.I. Manktelow & D.E. Over eds., 1993) (arguing that one cannot assign probabilities
to unique events and therefore that there is no normative basis for assigning error to stereotyp-
ing, and suggesting that one may eliminate errors by asking questions in terms of frequencies
rather than in terms of probabilities and increasing the use of random sampling); Kahneman &
Tversky, supra note 203, at 582-83 (acknowledging that representation in terms of absolute
frequencies improves accuracy, but citing studies to demonstrate that people nonetheless
perceive correlations that do not exist and that "some significant judgmental biases are not
readily corrected by the observation of natural frequencies"). For purposes of our discussion,
it is enough to note that both sides agree that parties rarely present information to
decisionmakers in a form-frequency-that is optimal for accuracy.
206. See Dawes, supra note 200, at 532 (explaining the fallacy of "considering the
probability of the evidence given the hypothesis... without looking at... the prior odds").
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A related problem is that people frequently overestimate the relevance of
memorable incidents at the expense of statistical base rates.2" It is not sur-
prising that people make judgments on the basis of what they remember."re
The problem arises, however, when people think that what they remember is
representative of the population as a whole. For example, medical student and
physician participants greatly overestimated the number of dramatic deaths in
a study that asked participants to estimate the number of deaths caused by
each of forty-two diseases.'" Thus, the vivid recounting in the media of the
statistically rare incidents of violent recidivism may well disproportionately
influence jurors in their decision. 1'
In addition, because the jurors have recently heard in graphic detail how
the defendant committed one atrociously violent act, they will likely believe
that it represents the way that the defendant will behave in the future. The
representativeness heuristic suggests that jurors do not refer to base rates (of
which they are usually ignorant in any event) in their decisionmaking process.
The anchoring heuristic suggests that because the jurors first learned about the
defendant in the context of a graphically violent crime, they are likely to
persist in thinking of the defendant as violent, even in the face of contrary
evidence.21' People frequently arrive at a decision that varies according to
their starting point.2"' The availability heuristic, the tendency of people to
207. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 205, at 164 (describing the availability heuristic).
208. For example, "a judgment of the prevalence of suicide in a community is likely to be
mediated by the case with which instances come to mind; this is an example of the availability
heuristic." Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 203, at 582.
209. See Jay Christensen-Szalanski et al., Effects of Expertise and Experience on Risk
Judgments, 68 J. APP. PSYCHOL. 278,278 (1983) (identifying a study showing that experts and
non-experts make differently biased risk judgments because of their differing exposure to risky
events).
210. Interviews with capital jurors, for example, found that jurors overwhelmingly
underestimated the amount of time that a defendant would have to serve before becoming
eligible for parole, relying primarily on memory of vivid media accounts of violent recidivism.
See William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default: An EmpiricalDemonstration
of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEX. L. REV. 605, 671-72 (1999)
(discussing the interviews of 916 capital jurors in the Capital Juror Project).
211. Anchoring is the tendency for arbitrary starting points to influence decisions. Daniel
Kahneman et al., Economic Preferences or Attitude Expressions? An Anabsis of Dollar
Responses to Public Issues, in CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMEs 642,665-66 (Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (describing the anchoring effect as a response that "is strongly
biased toward any value, even if it is arbitrary, that the respondent is induced to consider as a
candidate answer" and noting that the anchoring effect is one of "the most robust observations
of the psychological literature").
212. For example, when asked to estimate percentages of United Nations countries that are
African after being exposed to the result of a spin on a wheel of fortune---an obviously random
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confuse the facility with which they can recall an event with its likelihood of
213recurrence, suggests that the jurors will confuse vivid recollection of a
horrendous crime that the defendant committed with future propensities for
violence.
These problems are not insoluble. It is possible to help the jury make
more rational (less biased) decisions. The future dangerousness determination
is key to the jury's life or death determination.214 Giving jurors plain alterna-
tives to inform their sentencing judgment would help.2" Jurors' release
estimates strongly correlate with their final punishment vote.216 The issue of
danger is intertwined with the question of "danger when?"121  Studies invari-
ably report significant decreases in violent behavior as people age.21
Making the probabilistic nature of the evaluation explicit tends to reduce
the frequency of these errors.219 Moreover, presenting probabilistic evidence
in frequentist terms makes it more comprehensible.220 People are capable of
sound reasoning if a party presents them the information correctly." Thus,
and irrelevant value-people responded with marked differences according to the value spun on
the wheel (the median answer of people for whom the value on the wheel was 10 was consider-
ably lower than that for people exposed to a wheel value of 65). Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics andBiases, 185 Sci. 1124, 1128 (1974).
Cognitive psychologists explain this seemingly irrational behavior as the anchoring effect, in
which people make decisions according to some (perhaps irrelevant) starting value.
213. See id. at 163 (describing the availability heuristic and the cognitive biases that may
result).
214. See John H. Blume et al., Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases: Always "At
Issue", 86 CoRNmEiLL. REv. 397,398-99 (2001) (observing, on the basis of interviews with over
one hundred capital jurors, that "future dangerousness is on the minds of most capital jurors,
and is thus 'at issue' in virtually all capital trials, no matter what the prosecution says or does
not say").
215. See Bowers & Steiner, supra note 210, at 609 (arguing that keeping jurors uninformed
about sentencing alternatives skews the decision in favor of death).
216. See id. at 665 (noting that "jurors who estimate release in 20 or more years are
consistently and substantially less likely to vote for death than those who thought release would
come in 0-9 years or 10-19 years").
217. See John F. Edens et al., Psychopathy and the Death Penalty: Can the Psychopathy
Checklist-Revised Identify Offenders Who Represent "a Continuing Threat to Society? ", 29 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 433, 451 (2001) (contending that the real question should be how dangerous
the defendant will be upon release in twenty years or within the confines of an institution).
218. See id. at 444-45 (reporting that violence decreases as age increases).
219. See Gerd Gigerenzer, From Tools to Theories: A Heuristic of Discovery in Cognitive
Psychology, 98 PSYCHOL REV. 254,267 (1991) (explaining the value of a structured reasoning
process).
220. See generally GERD GIGERENZER, CALCULATED RISK (2002).
221. See Koehler, supra note 194, at 15 (citing studies demonstrating that presenting
information in certain ways improves people's capability of sound probabilistic reasoning).
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if experts were to testify in such a way as to make the probabilistic nature of
their assessment task both explicit and frequentist, neither of which they
currently do, they would aid the jury in its task of making an accurate deci-
sion.222
b. Egocentrism and Cognitive Dissonance
A well-documented bias of individuals is a tendency to overrate their
abilities and their control over events, at least when the questions are difficult
and the decisionmakers have no prior experience in making such decisions.'
Across cultures, people appear to overestimate their ability to provide correct
answers to questions.224 This overconfidence may have unforeseen conse-
quences in the context of capital sentencing. People tend to believe that their
judgment is correct. 22 In addition, the social environment of the jury deliber-
222. See generally Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 39 (arguing that this feature
of certain actuarial instruments-providing an explicit probabilistic assessment--should
improve jury decisionmaking).
223. See Gigerenzer, supra note 205, at 297-300 (noting the results of two decades of
research showing that test participants were overconfident when judging the correctness of their
answers to difficult general knowledge questions, but when directed to assess their correctness
with reference to their prior experience in answering similar general knowledge tests, their
overconfidence disappears). The problem for jurors is that they do not have any such reference
points when it comes to assessing the defendant's dangerousness. The major determinant of
overconfidence is the difficulty of the question. See Lyle A. Brenner et al., Overconfidence in
Probability and Frequency Judgments: A Critical Examination, 65 ORo. BEHAV. & HUMAN
DECISION PRoc. 212, 213 (1996) (observing that "the major (though not the sole) determinant
of overconfidence is the difficulty of the questions"). Researchers have observed overconfi-
dence in a number of predictive tasks, including physicians' predictions of disease, economists'
forecasts of recession, and players' predictions of their opponents' moves. See id. at 213 (citing
studies demonstrating overconfidence in predictive tasks). However, as one researcher points
out, we do not know if the kind of question domain makes a difference, or "whether there are
simply some domains in which we tend to exaggerate the accuracy of our knowledge or
judgment (not in others)." Robyn M. Dawes & Matthew Mulford, The False Consensus Effect
and Overconfidence: Flaws in Judgment or Flaws in How We Study Judgment?, 65 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESsEs 201,210 (1996). Nonetheless, although we do not
know whether the results in the general knowledge questions apply equally to the decision that
the jurors make in capital sentencing, if our goal is to improve accuracy, we should implement
ways of minimizing such effects.
224. See Mitchell, supra note 191, at 132 (citing studies showing that Asians, with the
exception of Japanese and Singaporeans, are even more overconfident than Westerners).
225. See Hart Blanton et al., Overconfidence as Dissonance Reduction, 37 . EXPT'L SOC.
PSYCHOL. 373, 373 (2001) (citing studies asking people to evaluate their ability in solving
laboratory problems and showing that "people think that they can solve problems that they
cannot, think that they have made progress toward correct solutions when they have not, and
think that they have drawn correct conclusions when they have not").
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ations may increase overconfidence, given that researchers have demonstrated
greater overconfidence in people acting within small social networks.2 '
Researchers characterize these networks as having three to fifteen members
(a characteristic that juries, normally twelve members, share); someone in a
central, coordinating position (here, the judge); and weak contact with outsid-
ers (judges typically tell juries not to discuss the case with anyone).
A number of different explanations account for overconfidence bias, and
each of these accounts has implications for jury decisionmaking and empha-
sizes the importance of judicial screening of expert testimony for accuracy.
For example, people may "confuse easily drawn inferences for easily remem-
bered facts."' ' In addition, people might selectively focus on evidence that
is consistent with their first impression and ignore inconsistent evidence.'m
Finally, people's overconfidence is a buffer against anxiety.2
Moreover, cognitive dissonance theory suggests that people tend to take
further actions that justify and reinforce decisions that they have already
made.23 For example, gamblers and voters are more confident after they have
placed their bets or votes than they were before." The jury has already
decided that the defendant is a very dangerous person when it found the
defendant guilty, and the overconfidence bias tends to make them more
confident in their action-a guilty verdict-than the facts would suggest. Any
information that supports their decision is likely to have a disproportionate
impact on their sentencing decision because of the related phenomenon of
226. See Joshua Klayman et al., Overconfidence: It Depends on How, What, and Whom
You Ask, 79 ORe. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PRoc. 216,243 (1999) (finding an overall bias
toward overconfidence, particularly in small social networks).
227. Blanton et al., supra note 225, at 374 (citing studies).
228. See id. (citing studies). See generally Eddie Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills, An
Introduction to Cognitive Dissonance Theory and an Overview of Current Perspectives on the
Theory, in COGNTVE DISSONANCE: PROGRESS ONAPIVOTALTHEORYIN SOCIALPSYCHOLOGY
3, 3-19 (Eddie Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills eds., 1999) (citing studies demonstrating that
people selectively seek information that will decrease expected post-decision dissonance).
229. See Jeff Greenberg et al., Why Do People Need Self-Esteem? Converging Evidence
that Self-Esteem Serves an Anxiety-Buffering Function, 63 J. PERSONALUTY & SOC. PsYCHOL.
913, 913-21 (1992) (arguing that self-esteem sustains the illusion of control and diminishes
anxiety).
230. See generally LEON FgSTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNrrIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
Festinger's theory provoked a great deal of controversy, but the empirical basis for it appears
to have survived the controversy. See, e.g., Dawes, supra note 200, at 557-61 (detailing the
controversy and concluding that "cognitive dissonance theory is resilient").
231. See Blanton et al., supra note 225, at 374 (arguing that "overconfidence reflects the
motive to maintain a view of the self as a knowledgeable perceiver who makes sound judg-
ments" and citing studies demonstrating this proposition).
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cognitive dissonance.232 This outcome appears to be what happens in capital
sentencing: capital jurors overwhelmingly focus on the question of guilt even
after the verdict when they are supposed to focus on the separate question of
the appropriate punishment.2 33  Overconfidence and cognitive dissonance
suggest that jurors may place too much confidence in their decision of guilt
and subsequently overvalue the expert prediction that confirms their decision,
giving disproportionate weight to any information that confirms their initial
decision of guilt. 4 This reason further justifies excluding testimony unsup-
ported by data, such as when an expert testifies with more certainty than is
warranted (i.e., the statement that he can be "one-hundred percent certain" that
the defendant will kill again).
c. The Dilution Effect
The dilution effect is a cognitive bias that occurs when people receive
complex information, some of which is relevant to the decision task and some
of which is irrelevant.23 When people are asked to judge whether someone
else has a particular characteristic, such as aggressiveness, their judgments
tend to be more focused (and accurate) when they receive only relevant
information; even obviously irrelevant details appear to affect judgment."
The dilution problem arises because irrelevant information obscures
relevant information. 7 It may also arise because, in a testing context, people
232. Cognitive dissonance is a phenomenon in which people will adjust their attitudes and
beliefs in order to justify a previously undertaken decision or course of action. See generally
FESTINGER, supra note 230.
233. See Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt Is
Overwhelming; Aggravation RequiresDeath; and Mitigation Is No Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. REV.
1011, 1017-19 (2001) (describing the capital juror project and its findings that jurors continue
to focus on guilt after the verdict and that they appear to ignore, discredit, and devalue mitigat-
ing evidence even when it appears extensive and credible).
234. See, e.g., Ziva Kunda, The Casefor Motivated Reasoning, 8 PsYCHOL. BULL. 480,
480 (1990) (observing that people will often construct theories and use evidence in ways that
make their final inferences come out the way that they want them to).
235. Some of the classic work on the dilution effect was that of Philip E. Tetlock and his
co-authors. See, e.g., Philip E. Tetlock et al., The Dilution Effect: Judgment Bias, Conversa-
tional Convention, or a Bit of Both?, 26 EUR. J. PSYCHOL. 915, 916-17 (1996) (citing studies
demonstrating that "linking diagnostic with nondiagnostic evidence produced more regressive
predictions than people would otherwise have made").
236. See Dawes, supra note 200, at 532, 537 ("Dilution effects occur when evidence that
does not distinguish between hypotheses in fact influences people to change their mind.").
237. "Docisionmakers allow irrelevant information to alter the decisions that they would
otherwise choose by considering only relevant information." Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive
Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review ofAgency Rulemaking, 87 CORNEI L. REV.
486, 502 (2002) (using the example of a guess about a student's grade point average, in which
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focus on social cues and assume that the experimenter would not present them
with information unless he expected them to consider it.238 Irrelevant inforna-
tion ought to be ignored, but it is not.21' The dilution effect explains the
harmful consequences of simply permitting the jury to hear expert testimony
and then try to sort out its relevance for themselves.
d The Dynamics of Group Decisionmaking
In addition to the dilution effect, the dynamics of group decisionmaking
also bear on why the Barefoot court incorrectly believed that the jury delibera-
tion is the right phase of the proceeding to sort out good science from bad.
The jury's sentencing determination is unanimous, a group decision reached
after deliberation; it is based on ideals of deliberative democracy that argu-
ment and reflection among competing views will lead to better-more
accurate-outcomes.2" At the same time, however, a single dissenter can
shift the result to a hung jury. Thus, the process has aspects both of group
consensus reaching and interactive individual decisionmaking.
Although both individual and group decisionmaking are subject to
biases-decisions about what and how information is relevant24 -some
characteristics of group decisionmaking emphasize the importance of protect-
people gave very different predictions about a student's grade point average when told only the
number of hours studied weekly than when also told how many plants the student kept). There
are two major explanations for this effect, the representativeness heuristic, in which people
select outcomes depending on the degree to which the evidence fits stereotypical patterns, and
norms about social discourse, in which the experiment participants expect that information
given them is relevant to their task. Id.
238. See Tctlock et al., supra note 235, at 916 (observing that "[flar from representing an
error, the dilution effect may constitute a rational response to the interpersonal and institutional
demands that impinge on individual perceivers").
239. See Dawes, supra note 200, at 537 (noting that "[s]omeone who has a strong opinion
based on very strong evidence may be influenced to 'moderate' this opinion by exposure to a
flurry of uninformative information").
240. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?, Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE
L.J. 71, 73-75 (2000) (noting the received view that group deliberation yields an outcome that
takes everyone's position into account and contending that, on the contrary, people deliberating
in groups tend to polarize their positions from that of any individual member).
241. See Chip Heath & Rich Gonzalez, Interaction with Others Increases Decision
Confidence but Not Decision Quality: Evidence Against Information Collection Views of
InteractiveDecision Making, 61 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROC. 305,323 (1995) (noting
that individual interactive decisionmaking exhibits similar characteristics to group consensus
decisionmaking); Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: ComparingIndividuals and Groups,
103 PSYCHOL. REv. 687, 714-15 (1996) (defining bias as reflecting "decisions about whether
and how to use information" and demonstrating that "groups will amplify bias under some
conditions but attenuate it under others").
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ing the jury from irrelevant information that exacerbates biases and providing
instructions that can guide the group's reasoning process. Group decisions are
better than individual decisions when evaluating information that has a
demonstrably correct solution."4 The reason is that the errors of individuals
in assessing information tend to cancel each other out.243 Thus, I do not argue
that the judicial system should replace the jury in criminal trials or in capital
sentencing proceedings. I do suggest that the confluence of systematic errors
in the context of sentencing proceedings requires that judges carefully screen
information that the jury will use to make its collective decision.
The argument that collective decisionmaking should cancel out judgmen-
tal errors does not work for systematic biases.2 Rather, collective processes
under certain conditions skew the decision away from judgmental accuracy.245
These conditions are precisely those that a jury faces in making its determi-
nation-for example, predictive judgment tasks, tasks in which jurors have no
clearly shared framework for defining right or wrong answers.246
One anomalous tendency of group decisions is that groups often polarize;
that is, the group will make a more extreme decision than the initial position
of any individual in the group would have predicted.247 The result is that
242. See Daniel Gigone & Reid Hastie, Proper Analysis of the Accuracy of Group
Judgments, 121 PSYCHOL. BULL. 149, 149 (1997) (noting that when one group member can
justify correct answers, the rest of group usually decides the correct answer).
243. See id. at 159 (observing the cancellation of uncorrelated errors in group
decisionmaking).
244. See Kerr et al., supra note 241, at 713-14 (noting that although the law of large
numbers suggests that random errors will cancel each other out in collective decisions, it will
not do so for systematic errors).
245. See id. at 714-15 (citing studies demonstrating the benefits of group over individual
decisionmaking).
246. See, e.g., Garold Stasser et al., The Social Psychology of Jury Deliberations:
Structure, Process and Product, in THE PsYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 221, 221-56
(Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982) (providing studies demonstrating various
factors' effects upon the jury decisionmaking process).
247. See, e.g., Daniel J. Isenberg, Group Polarization: A Critical Review and Meta-
Analwis, 50 J. PERSONALTY & Soc. PSYCH OL. 1141, 1141 (1986) (noting that "an initial
tendency of individual group members toward a given direction is enhanced following group
discussion"). A number of theories explain this tendency, such as social comparison theory
(people initially espouse opinions less extreme than their true opinion because they fear being
labeled deviant, and once they realize that others have more extreme opinions they shift theirs
to the true value); persuasive arguments theory (explaining group polarization on the basis of
a pool of arguments drawn from discussion among the group members); self-categorization
theory (group members define the social identity of the group and then modify their positions
to conform with it); social influence network theory (a network of interpersonal influence); and
social decisions schemes (the distribution of initial opinions specifies the relative influence of
the alternative initial positions of group members). See Noah E. Friedkin, Choice Shift and
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group decisions tend to coalesce around an extreme position rather than
around the middle of antecedent positions.24s In mock-jury studies, research-
ers have extensively documented polarization around the question of guilt or
innocence.249 In interactive groups, group members tend not to respond to
information against their position by modifying their position or lowering
their confidence. Instead, researchers have found that interaction increases
group members' confidence in their decision in a way that is unjustified by
increased accuracy.' ° Group members frequently fail to respond to the
information presented."1
The term "social loafing" describes the observed phenomenon that
individuals put less effort into a group decision than into an individual deci-
sion." 2 The classic experiments deal with physical exertion, such as rope
pulling, shouting, and clapping, and at all these tasks, group output tends to
Group Polarization, 64 AM. Soc. REv. 856, 857-60 (1999) (discussing alternative explana-
tions). Discussion of the alternative explanations is well beyond the scope of this Article.
248. See Friedkin, supra note 247, at 857 (explaining the concept of group polarization in
terms of a choice shift, which occurs "when, after a group's interaction on an issue, the mean
final opinion of group members differs from the members' mean initial opinion ... in the
opposite direction of the initial inclination of the group").
249. See ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 227-29 (2d ed. 1986) (collecting studies).
Very diverse groups tend to diminish this effect. Sunstein, supra note 240, at 116 (citing James
Fishkin's experiments demonstrating an absence of polarization effects in groups composed of
highly diverse individuals). In one respect, however, capital juries are not heterogeneous at all:
in order to serve on the jury, jurors must be willing to support the death penalty (in the appro-
priate case, as the voir dire usually instucts juries). Counter-intuitively, it might be less
polarizing to have a diversity of opinions about the legitimacy of the death penalty.
250. See Heath & Gonzalez, supra note 241, at 306 (arguing that interaction does not cause
people to assess the available information differently but merely to develop more coherent
rationales for their choices and beliefs). Heath and Gonzalez studied interactive
decisionmaking-individual decisions made after consultation with the group-and distin-
guished it from group decisionmaking on the basis that groups must reach a consensus and the
"aggregation procedure may hide or distort changes in individual preferences." Id. at 307. Jury
decisionmaking has facets of both interactive and group decisionmaking; although the end
product must be a consensual decision, in order to avoid a hung jury, each juror must individu-
ally agree, and each can hold out until persuaded. Moreover, Heath and Gonzalez concluded
that consensus decisionmaking is not the only kind of group decision that exhibits the character-
istics of groupthink. Id. at 323. The characteristics of groupthink, "'discount[ing] warnings and
other forms of negative feedback that, taken seriously, might lead the group members to
reconsider their assumptions,' ... provide a remarkably satisfying description of the phenome-
non... of individual decision makers interacting in a social environment" Id.
251. See id. at 323 (finding it "much harder to find evidence of information collection" in
group studies conducted, a difficulty that surprised the authors).
252. See Seidenfeld, supra note 237, at 511 ("Social loafing occurs when an individual
participates in producing a group product; such loafing has been established in the context of
group decisionmaking.").
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be less than the sum of the individuals' efforts when performing the same task
alone.253 Researchers have extended this work to judgment tasks, with similar
results.254 The reasons given for social loafing have to do with lack of ac-
countability, inability to measure individual input, and lack of control over the
output.255 When, for example, researchers told test participants that they
would have to justify their judgments, they exerted as much cognitive effort
as individual judges.256
Moreover, pressures for uniformity and group loyalty can build up in
collective decision processes to the point at which they adversely affect both
cognitive efficiency and moral judgment. 257 Irving Janis analyzed a number
of political decisions and concluded that group dynamics could lead to poli-
cies that "deserved to be fiascoes."258 Janis found that group members in these
"fiascoes" were so motivated to maintain each other's respect that it inhibited
critical thought and dissenting opinions.259 Groups isolated from outside
influences and lacking systematic procedures for evaluating evidence were
especially prone to this kind of cognitive' error."6 Stressful conditions further
magnified these effects.26" ' As a result, in the fiasco situations, decisionmakers
253. See Bibb Latane et al., Many Hands Make Light the Work: The Causes and Conse-
quences of SocialLoafing, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHoL. 822, 822-23 (1979) (discuss-
ing the Ringelman effect under these testing conditions). Although scholars have documented
social loafing under diverse conditions, it appears to disappear under conditions of accountabil-
ity. For example, social loafing is virtually eliminated when people learn that their individual
production will be measured, even when working in groups. Kenneth L. Bettenhausen, Five
Years of Groups Research: What We Have Learned and What Needs to Be Addressed, 17 J.
MGMr. 345,361 (1991).
254. See Bettenhausen, supra note 253, at 361 (citing studies showing that people who
shared responsibility for a complex judgment task put less cognitive effort into the task than
individuals working alone).
255. See id. at 360-61 (explaining that "the phenomenon appears to center on the
identifiability of the actor .... [S]ocial loafing was virtually eliminated when undergraduates
were told their individual noise production would be measured .... [and] the potential for
evaluation... increased motivation whether subjects could self-evaluate or not.").
256. See generally Kenneth H. Price, Decision Responsibility, Task Responsibility,
Identifiability, and SocialLoafing, 40 ORG. BEHAv. & HUMAN DECISION PROC. 330-45 (1987).
257. See Philip E. Tetlock et al., Assessing Political Group Dynamics: A Test of the
Groupthink Model, 63 J. PERSONAITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 403, 403 (1992) (performing
multiple regression analysis of various collective decision processes and finding ample support
for the groupthink hypothesis first advanced by Irving Janis).
258. IRVING L. JANM5, GROUPTHINK 9 (2d ed. 1982).
259. Id.
260. See id. at 199 (listing insulation of policy-making groups as one of the three condi-
tions contributing to groupthink).
261. See id. at 258-59 (finding higher propensity for groupthink under stressful condi-
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began to experience excessive optimism about the correctness of their judg-
ment, silencing deviant opinions in order to re-establish consensus. The kinds
of cognitive errors from this kind of group pressure include: (a) truncated
consideration of alternatives and objectives (often, the group discussed only
the option initially favored by group members), (b) a failure to examine the
risks of the initially preferred choice, (c) a failure to reappraise initially
rejected alternatives, (d) poor search for relevant information, (e) biased
processing of information, and (f) a failure to work out contingency plans in
the event that known risks materialized.262
The situation for group decisionmaking is not irremediable, however.
Janis contrasted the "groupthink" conditions with conditions (he called these
vigilance conditions) that led to more rational outcomes. Critical appraisal
and open discussion of options made for more careful analysis. Group final
judgment depends on both the relative beginning positions of the individual
members and the processes by which the group combines preferences to
define a group decision.263 The importance of screening expert testimony for
relevance and reliability has to do with focusing the starting point of delibera-
tions. If the individual members recognize the normative use of particular
information, the fact that the group is more likely to use that information
properly emphasizes the importance of clear jury instructions.2
D. Proposed Solution: Gatekeeping in Capital Sentencing Proceedings
Judicial gatekeeping-screening for accuracy before permitting expert
testimony-makes for more accurate judgments for a number of reasons.265
As Robert Bums explains, the proper question with regard to admissibility is
whether the evidence at issue would throw the jury "off track" in its goal of
tions).
262. Tetlock et al., supra note 257, at 404 (citing Janis).
263. See Kerr et al., supra note 241, at 694 (drawing mathematical conclusions in group
decisionmaking).
264. See id. at 715 (arguing that guidance in principles of rational judgment improves
collective decisionmaking).
265. As discussed earlier in this Article, to call something an "accurate" judgment is a
normative statement that raises complex issues about what we know, how we know it, and what
our goals are. In the context of the goals of a capitol juror, the jury appears to focus on the goal
of determining whether this defendant would kill again if released. Interviews with capital
jurors reflect this overwhelming concern. See Bowers & Steiner, supra note 210, at 665-67
(discussing the Capital Juror Project). The arguments of lawyers and legal scholars that the
question ought to be whether the defendant will pose a threat to other inmates or prison
personnel are beside the point. My point is simply that in light of their goal, the presentation
of irrelevant (unscientific) expert testimony makes their determination less accurate.
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reaching the public truth.2" The dilution effect explains the importance of
screening irrelevant information from jury decisionmaking. People participat-
ing in experiments expect that information given to them for the purpose of
making a decision is relevant.267 Similarly, jurors, who already participated
in the guilt phase of the trial, have experienced judicial screening and may
expect that whatever information they receive is relevant to their task.2"
When it is not relevant, the jury's decision will be less accurate than it would
be if the court had excluded such evidence.
The dilution effect disappears, however, when people are made account-
able for their judgment-as judges are by judicial review-as long as the
decisionmaker knows that parties are presenting both relevant and irrelevant
information.269 In contrast, the dilution effect occurs even when one tells
unaccountable individuals (jurors are unaccountable because they never need
to explain the reason for their decision) that they are receiving both relevant
and irrelevant information and that they need to sort through it to reach their
decision."' Irrelevant and inaccurate information throws group decisions off
track even more than it does individual judgment. Thus, the dilution effect
suggests that merely presenting evidence that counters the misinformation
may not be enough.
Moreover, judges are experts because they make repeat decisions in the
presence of feedback. People who repeat the decisionmaking process many
times in the presence of feedback regarding their accuracy are more likely to
266. See ROBERT BUTRNs, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 22 (2001) (discussing the need for
materiality in evidence).
267. See Tetlock et al., supra note 235, at 915 (studying dilution effect).
268. For example, Tetlock and his co-authors found that test participants, even when told
that a computer randomly generated the information and that it contained both relevant and
irrelevant information, still made more regressive estimates given the irrelevant information.
See id. at 926-27 (discussing research results).
269. See id. at 930-31 (demonstrating that "the dilution effect disappears among account-
able subjects who were explicitly told that conversational norms did not apply because the
information they had been given had been randomly selected from a computer database ... [or]
conversational norms were explicitly deactivated").
270. Even if one assumed that jurors were accountable, in the sense that they must render
a public decision and may have to explain their reasons to friends and family, it is only the
accountability to unknown audiences that appears to affect the care with which they scrutinize
information. See Philip E. Tetlock & Richard Boettger, Accountability: A Social Magnifier of
the Dilution Effect, 57 J. PERsONALTY & Soc. PSYCHOL 388,388 (1989) (defining accountabil-
ity).
271. See Tetlock ct al., supra note 235, at 931 (demonstrating that "explicitly deactivating
conversational norms was not sufficient to eliminate the dilution effect among unaccountable
subjects").
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make accurate judgments.272 Judges get more feedback than juries through the
appellate process and through legal scholarship and commentary. Expertise
tends to decrease both technical errors and the consideration of irrelevant
information." Experts (such as judges) trained in decision rules (such as the
analysis required under Daubert) tend to make better judgments about validity
than lay people (jurors) who are unaware of these rules." 4 Training can
improve reasoning."' Judges, who have extensive training in legal analysis
and, post-Daubert, in reasoning about expert testimony, can make better
evaluations of such testimony than untrained jurors. In addition, although the
overconfidence bias may afflict experts more than novices,"S groups are more
prone to it than individuals.277
Further, accountability can significantly improve the quality of some
kinds of judgment."" Individuals making judgments under conditions of
accountability are more likely to be careful and thoughtful than groups making
judgments without individual accountability.279 Judges are accountable not
only to their superior courts but also to a wider audience of legal scholars and
practitioners who will comment on their decisions. Accountability to an
272. See Rachlfinsk, supra note 197, at 756 (citing feedback as a prerequisite to leaming).
273. See Seidenfeld, supra note 237, at 499 (discussing biases mitigated by expertise).
274. See Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 195, at 263 (explaining that accountability, which
may attenuate biases resulting from lack of effort or self-critical awareness, has no effect on
judgment tasks requiring knowledge of formal decision rules that are unfamiliar to the
decisionmaker).
275. See Mitchell, supra note 191, at 87 n.48 (citing studies showing the extent to which
training increases the accuracy of decisionmaking).
276. See Seidenfeld, supra note 237, at 498 (noting that overconfidence in predictions is
a "bias to which experts may be more prone than novices").
277. See Tetlock et al., supra note 257, at 418-19 (noting that "groupthink" promoted rigid
and self-righteous patterns of thinking).
278. See Shelley E. Taylor, The Social Being in Social Psychology, in I THE HANDBOOK
OF SOcIALPsYcoLooy 58,76 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) ("Accountability for
one's inferences produces more thorough and more elaborate processing that takes account of
more information and that is, at least sometimes, more accurate than processing that occurs in
the absence of accountability."). Because the conditions of judicial gatekeeping review are
precisely those that increase accuracy, it is the judge rather then the jury who should be the
locus of the decision about admissibility of expert testimony. Cf Seidenfeld, supra note 237,
at 509-10 (explaining that judicial review of agency decisionmaking falls within the definition
of accountability because courts examine the arguments pertaining to the validity of agency
reasoning). Like judicial review of agency decisions, judicial review of gatekeeping determina-
tions similarly examines the basis on which the judge made the determination.
279. See Bettenhausen, supra note 253, at 361 (citing studies demonstrating that people
in groups of sixteen who shared responsibility for the judgment task "used less complex
judgment strategies than subjects working alone," although "multiple judges who expected to
justify their judgments worked as hard as individual judges").
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unknown audience enhances careful decisionmaking. s° People who know
that they will have to justify their decisions ahead of time, as judges do,
perform better cognitively."s  Moreover, when the accountability review
evaluates the process resulting in the judgment rather than the outcome, those
process judgments improve under conditions of accountability. 2  The
gatekeeping decision of the judge is reviewable primarily for its process rather
than its outcome,283 so one would expect a more careful and critical evaluation
of the evidence than one could expect from jurors, who at most may have
some outcome accountability in terms of possible negative consequences from
their community.
In addition, some cognitive reasons, apart from the empirical invalidity
of clinical judgment, show that actuarial testimony presented as a frequency
determination is apt to be less skewed than a subjective accuracy detennina-
tion. People making decisions, whether jurors or judges, make better deci-
sions when presented with frequentist probabilities rather than subjective
probabilities. 4 People, for example, asked how many times out often they
are likely to choose the wrong answer are more likely to be accurate, even
when they assess their accuracy at ninety-five percent. 23 Thus, not only is
actuarial testimony better science, it is better for the decisionmaking process.
Gatekeeping is an important first step, but clear jury instructions are also
a factor. Studies demonstrate that jurors lack understanding of how to weigh
the evidence presented in death penalty proceedings."' Jurors simply do not
280. See Lemer & Tetlock, supra note 195, at 256 (explaining that "people often seek
approval from their respective audience," and if "audience views are known prior to forming
one's own opinion, conformity becomes the likely coping strategy," and the result is likely to
decrease rather than increase accuracy as it does when the person making the opinion does not
know the audience).
281. See id. at 257 (acknowledging that postdcisional accountability leads to self-
justification rather than self-criticism and thus poor decision performance, but stating that
people who know that they will be held accountable before engaging in the judgment task tend
to be highly self-critical and more accurate).
282. See id. at 258 (citing studies showing that "accountability for decision out-
comes--rather than decision processes---would increase the escalation of commitment to prior
courses of action .. . [while] [p]rocess accountability, by contrast, would (a) lead decision
makers to engage in more evenhanded evaluation of alternatives and (b) decrease the need for
self-justification").
283. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (discussing the
admissibility of expert testimony).
284. See GIGERENZER, supra note 220, at 7 and passim (urging communication of risk in
frequentist terms).
285. Id.
286. See James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions:
Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161, 1176-77 (1995) (demonstrating how confusing jury
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know how to assess the expert testimony." 7 These misunderstandings play a
pivotal role because jurors use juror instructions as persuasive devices. 2s8
Frequently, jurors think that the instructions require them to impose death
unless they can conceive of a reason not to do so.2"9 Thus, not only do judges
need to exercise their gatekeeping powers, they need to clarify the instructions
that they give the jury.
V Gatekeeping Risk: Scientific Validity ofActuarial Testimony
A. Complexity Theory and the Inherent Limits of Prediction
The precise prediction of future behavior is impossible.2"c At best,
predictions in complex systems are highly contingent, and human behavior is
a paradigmatic complex system.29 Complexity theory explains that human
individuals are interacting parts of a complex world, interacting with our
environment and other creatures, and that each brain originating behavior is
itself a complex organ.2" The most successful predictions are of weather
phenomena, and even there, small changes in underlying conditions can have
a huge impact on the result.293 This impact is because small errors in determin-
instructions systematically predispose jurors toward a sentence of death).
287. See Joseph L. Hoffmann, Where's the Buck?-Juror Misperception of Sentencing
Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L. J. 1137,1149-50 (1995) (citing Capital Juror
Project interviews of jurors who found death penalty instructions confusing, particularly with
regard to how they were supposed to evaluate aggravating and mitigating factors).
288. See Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 286, at 1177 (analyzing the effect of ambiguous
jury instructions in capital cases).
289. See Hoffman, supra note 287, at 1152 (describing the statements of capital jurors).
290. See Paul E. Plsck & Trisha Oreenhaigh, The Challenge of Complexity in Health Care,
323 BRT. J. MED. 625,625 (2001) (explaining the problem of prediction in terms of complexity
theory).
291. "A complex adaptive system is a collection of individual agents with freedom to act
in ways that are not always totally predictable, and whose actions are interconnected so that one
agent's actions changes the context for other agents." Id. (giving as examples the immune
system, a colony of termites, the financial market, and "just about any collection of humans").
292. See ILYA PRIGOoNE, THE END OF CERTAINTY: T1ME, CHAOS AND THE NEW LAWS OF
NATURE 4-5 (1996) (explaining that while "[c]lassical science emphasized order and stability,
now, in contrast, we see fluctuations, instability, multiple choices, and limited predictability at
all levels of observation... [so that] we are now able to include probabilities in the formulation
of the basic laws of physics"); Mark D. Albertson, Can Violence Be Predicted? Future
Dangerousness: The Testimony of Experts in Capital Cases, 3 CRiM. JUST. 18, 45 (1989)
(explaining that "a person-focused assessment... is extremely inaccurate because people do
not live in vacuums" and research emphasizes "the importance of situational and environmental
influences on behavior").
293. We cannot predict the weather because it is a "classic case of chaotic behavior."
RICHARD SOLE & BRIAN GOODWIN, SIGNS OF LIFE 9 (2000). The impossibility of prediction is
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ing the initial conditions (i.e., the predictors) may yield large errors in calculat-
ing expected outcomes, and even when one understands the properties of the
individual components, the behavior of a system with many interacting compo-
nents is inherently unpredictable.294 Weather patterns display both order and
chaos, so that weather predictions are fairly accurate for the next day, but fall
off rapidly for three-day forecasts and become highly chaotic after six days.
295
This analysis has implications for predicting human behavior, especially over
a lifetime.
Measuring initial conditions is crucial in making predictions about
complex systems such as the weather and human behavior. In weather predic-
tion, for example, "over 10,000 land-based stations and hundreds of ships
collect weather information daily at six-hour intervals."2' Nothing monitors
human behavior in such detail. We often do not know the relevant factors
about a defendant's environment (internal or external), and even what factors
are relevant is hotly debated.
Moreover, making accurate predictions requires expertise-that is,
accountability, feedback, and opportunities for repeat performance. Weather
experts, for example, make their predictions based on information from
weather stations, satellites, balloons, aircraft, and human spotters making daily
observations, all of which information funnels to one of several meteorological
centers.297 These centers generate regional reports, which are then adapted to
local conditions.2" This process means that one can generate and analyze a
huge amount of information at frequent intervals, something one unlikely can
achieve in human behavior.
Further, even using all available data, there are limits to prediction. 29
There are three reasons for these limits. First, the human brain is the premier
because "small errors in initial conditions give rise to very large errors in calculating expected
outcomes." Id. at 12. Complexity theory, the study of nonlinear systems (like weather),
involves both the study of chaos, with sensitivity to initial conditions that makes dynamics
unpredictable, and emergent properties, in which the general inability of observers to predict
the behavior of nonlinear systems from their parts and interactions. See id. at 20 (analyzing
parallels between chaos and emergent properties).
294. See id. at 13 (discussing scientific theory of reductionism).
295. See Richard A- Kerr, OfflcialForecasts Pushed Out to a YearAhead, 266 ScI. 1940,
1940 (1994) (explaining that weather predictions are "swamped by chaos beyond six days or
sol).
296. John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman, Violent Storms and Violent People: How
Meteorology Can Inform Risk Communication in Mental Health Law, 51 AM. PSYCHOL. 931,
933(1996).
297. See id. (explaining the collection of data by weather services).
298. Id.
299. See Robinson, supra note 172, at 1450 (describing the inability of science to predict
criminality even with all available data).
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example of nonlineaity-that is, there is no predictable relationship between
cause and effect." The brain is composed of multiple interacting and self-
regulating physiological systems, including biochemical and neuroendocrine
feedback loops, which influence human behavior partly through an internal set
of responses and partly through adaptive responses to new stimuli from the
environment, forming a web of interacting systems that are dynamic and
fluid.3 O' Second, an individual's conduct results both from internal stimuli and
from stimuli from the environment, including a web of relationships affecting
beliefs, expectations, and behavior. 2 Third, individuals and their immediate
social relationships are further embedded within wider social, political, and
cultural systems that are continuously interacting; nature, nurture, and notions
of free will all interact in a way that one can only consider probabilistic.
Seemingly inconsequential stimuli can radically alter the equilibrium of each
of these systems.
B. Actuarial Instruments: Admissible Under a Best Evidence Theory?
Because of the inherent limits of predictability in complex systems, the
most that can be said is that actuarial instruments may improve on the woeful
300. See SOLE & GOODWIN, supra note 293, at I (distinguishing the linear relationship
between cause and effect from nonlinearity).
301. As an article in a noted scientific journal explained:
The human body is composed of multiple interacting and self regulating physiologi-
cal systems including biochemical and neuroendocrine feedback loops. The
behavior of any individual is determined partly by an internal set of rules based on
past experience and partly by unique and adaptive responses to new stimuli from
the environment The web of relationships in which individuals exist contains
many varied and powerful determinants of their beliefs, expectations, and behavior.
Individuals and their immediate social relationships are further embedded within
wider social, political, and cultural systems which can influence outcomes in
entirely novel and unpredictable ways. All these interacting systems are dynamic
and fluid. A small change to one part of this web of interacting systems may lead
to a much larger change in another part through amplification effects. For all these
reasons, neither illness nor human behaviour is predictable and neither can safely
be "modelled" in a simple cause and effect system. The human body is not a
machine and its malfunctioning cannot be adequately analysed by breaking the
system down into its component parts and considering each in isolation.
Tim Wilson & Tim Holt, Complexity and Clinical Care, 323 BRIT. J. MED. 685, 685 (2001)
(citations omitted).
302. See generally ANTONIO R. DAMASiO, DEsCARTES' ERROR EMOTION, REASON, AND
TE HUMAN BRAIN (2000) (discussing the neural underpinnings of reason, emotion, and the
complex, interactive systems of the brain, which in turn interact with systems in the rest of the
body, the environment, other individuals, and culture).
60 WASH. &LEE L. REV 353 (2003)
inadequacy of clinical predictions. 3 Is that enough to get them through the
gate of scientific validity analysis? My answer is a tentative yes, based on the
Popperian notion that what makes a theory scientifically valid is its explana-
tory power."° Explanatory power is the ability of a theory, model, or hypothe-
sis to take into account all the observed data and to make a persuasive scien-
tific argument." 5 Unlike clinical diagnostic predictions, the explanatory
power of actuarial instruments rests on the idea of risk analysis, a statistical
methodology commonly used by epidemiologists, toxicologists, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, and the insurance industry, among others.
The theory underlying actuarial instruments is that structured reasoning
processes improve accuracy of judgment. Actuarial instruments do not
abandon human judgment; they simply structure it into a formal reasoning
process.3° Although some evidence suggests that a multidisciplinary team
may be able to rival the accuracy of actuarial instruments, empirical data
demonstrates that such structured analysis improves decisionmaking consider-
ably.3" Using structured analysis offers many advantages in human
decisionmaking, particularly in light of the difficulty that people have in
synthesizing differently weighted likelihoods of varying significance, such as
risk factors for violent behavior.3 8 Thus, actuarial instruments may offer a
distinct advantage in assessing risk of violent behavior."°9
303. See WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 35, at 20-21 (noting that courts and legislatures
continue to demand these predictions, although "three decades of research has failed to produce
an accurate scheme for predicting violence," and outlining a "scheme for prediction which we
hope will offer better accuracy").
304. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 5, at 1588-89 (discussing the concept of explanatory
power).
305. See I DLRE LAKATOS, THE METHODOLOY OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROGRAMMES
142 (1978) ("A hypothesis, however novel in its intuitive aspects, will not be allowed to be
proposed, unless it has novel empirical content in excess of its predecessor.").
306. See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 65 (discussing the value of human judgment
to actuarial prediction instruments); Dolan & Doyle, supra note 40, at 304 (observing that
"[s]tructured clinical judgment represents a composite of empirical knowledge and clini-
cal/professional expertise").
307. See Fuller & Cowan, supra note 39, at 286 (comparing multidiscipinary clinical
judgment with actuarial approaches).
308. See EISER & VAN DER PUGT, supra note 42, at 100 (observing that human decision
"accuracy declines considerably when the number of features or the number or alternatives
increases .... [R]eliability with which choice rules are used tends to decrease as the decision-
maker's information load increases.").
309. See Norval Morris & Marc Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, in CRIME AND
JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 1 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1985)
(concluding that an actuarial approach is best suited to predict violent behavior).
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Risk analysis is based on statistical concepts of correlation. Statistical
analysis provides an important tool for examining whether theories correspond
with observation."' One should not, however, permit statistical analyses to
generate hypotheses about causation. One cannot understand statistical
measurements within the context of the system under study. 311 Here, the
context is human behavior, a quintessentially complex phenomenon.31 ' And
although actuarial instruments measure observed statistical correlations of
violent behavior with factors such as past patterns of violence, age, and ability
to form lasting relationships, very little links these factors to a theory of
human violence. Moreover, one cannot expect statistics to provide an answer
about any particular individual.3"3 The most that one can say from even the
best statistical analyses is that someone falls within a group that has a certain
statistical propensity for violence.1 4
Further, actuarial instruments are risk assessment tools that combine a
number of risk factors to achieve an overall "score" that ranks levels of risk.1
Although researchers have analyzed various risk factors, and numerous studies
310. See Kenneth J. Rothman, Editorial, Significance Questing, 105 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 445,445 (1986) (discussing the value and limitations of statistical procedure to evaluate
measurement error regarding observations).
311. See THEODORE COLTON, STATIsTICs iN MEDIcINE 117,304 (1974) (explaining that a
result, although it may be statistically significant, may still be medically meaningless, and
cautioning against permitting statistical analyses to generate hypotheses).
312. Complexity theory recognizes the continuous interaction of individuals with the whole
system of which they are a part and that they respond to both random events and dynamic
phenomena. SOLE & GOODWIN, supra note 293, at 20 (noting the "continuous conversation
between parts and wholes").
313. As epidemiologists studying the statistical incidence of disease have discovered, one
simply cannot predict the probability of disease in any given case. See Sander Greenland &
James M. Robins, Epidemiology, Justice, and the Probability of Causation, 40 JuRIMETRICS J.
321, 328 (2000) (explaining that "when an exposure is known to be harmful in some cases,
available data from epidemiology and biology are simply incapable of telling us whether a given
case was 'more probably than not' harmed by exposure"). The most that one can say is that
exposure caused a certain statistical increase of disease over background levels.
314. The concept of probability to which I am referring is the idea of long-run relative
frequency. See COLTON, supra note 311, at 63 (defining the "probability of an event [as] the
event's long-run relative frequency in repeated trials under similar conditions"). That is, the
probability of recurring violence "is its relative frequency of occurrence-or the proportion of
times the event occurs-in a large number of trials repeated under virtually identical condi-
tions." MARTIN STE.NSTEIN, STATISTICS 15 (1994). "Virtually identical conditions" are hard
to come by in observational studies of humans (such as the studies underlying the violence risk
assessment tools). This difficulty is a pervasive problem for human studies, but one that does
not necessarily undermine their validity. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 5, at 1604-07
(discussing scientific validity of human studies).
315. See Monahan, supra note 187, at 903 (evaluating risk assessment instruments).
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corroborate their relationship to violent behavior, that is merely the beginning
of risk analysis. No one of these factors, standing alone, has significant
predictive power; one must analyze them in concert.3 6 One of the significant
problems with clinical judgment is an apparent inability to adjust predictions
according to these interrelationships.3"
. Repeated studies of actuarial methods have demonstrated them to be
superior to clinical judgment standing alone.' 8 Even such instruments,
however, with their structured reasoning requirements, do not obviate all the
problems of human judgment. For example, the risk factor descriptions may
be vague, decreasing their reliability.3"9 Sometimes the factors are not inde-
pendent; an example would be anger and the inability to sustain relation-
ships." ' Moreover, in assessing risk one must consider the time period that
the risk assessment covers, the circumstances for its implementation (prison
for life, in the case of capital sentencing, and perhaps eventual release into the
community after serving a minimum term of the life sentence32"), and the
individual's motivation to refrain from violence (including the motivation to
comply with treatment).3" Yet rarely do courts or actuarial instruments
address these considerations.
A further complication is that rare events-and recurring violence is
statistically rare, even among violent offenders-are inherently difficult to
predict. 23 The most that one can say for any actuarial risk assessment instru-
ment is that it can give a probabilistic estimate of the level of risk for people
who share characteristics with the person assessed. 24 And the estimate is
subject to a great deal of error.325
316. See John Monahan, Clinical andActuarial Predictions of Violence: Scientific Status,
in I THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 9-2.1.1, at 425 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that
"it is crucial for future studies to use multiple measures of violence rather than the single
measures that have characterized most prior research").
317. QUINSEY ET AL, supra note 31, at 56.
318. See Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 40, at 28 (recognizing that actuarial methods
are superior to clinical methods in predicting human behavior).
319. See Carson, supra note 42, at 258 (noting the problem of reliability). For example,
even trained clinicians may differ on what exactly is meant by "glibness" (a factor on the PCL-
R) or "lack of insight" (a factor on the VRAG and HCR-20).
320. Id.
321. This result occurs if permitted by statute; in some states, life term is without parole.
322. Carson, supra note 42, at 261.
323. See WEBSTER ET AL, supra note 35, at 5 (noting that "rare events are always harder
to forecast than frequent occurrences").
324. See id. at 33 (discussing probabilistic estimates of dangerousness).
325. As the VRAG authors explain, "there is a predictive sound barrier" of some unknown
dimension. QUNSEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 168. Although they assert that it is greater than
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It is important to bear in mind that risk is a social construct. Although it
uses probabilistic analysis and quantification, it is not an exact science.
26
Indeed, all science is value-laden, and risk assessment is not different in that
regard.3 2 A risk appraisal can inform, but cannot answer the ultimate ques-
tion of whether a jury ought to sentence a particular individual to death or to
life in prison." It is something that the jury must weigh, assessing the
relative costs of imprisoning a person that may ultimately prove to be violent
despite a mistaken prediction of nonviolence versus sentencing to death a
person mistakenly predicted to be violent.
Finally, a caveat. Even if actuarial testimony is demonstrably more
accurate than clinical testimony, not all actuarial testimony will meet the
standards of scientific validity. First, not all actuarial instruments have the
same empirical foundation.329 Second, experts may conclude more from the
instruments than they warrant and testify outside the scope of valid inferences.
This possibility is a particular problem when experts use a categorical rather
than a statistical articulation of their results: dangerous/not dangerous rather
than "this defendant falls within a group that has a _ probability of recurring
violence." Third, when experts rely on factors in addition to the actuarial
instruments, each of those factors must have a demonstrable empirical basis.
For example, in Barnette, not only did the expert testify that he relied on the
PCL-R for his opinion that the defendant posed a future danger to society, but
he also testified that psychopaths are like "fake fruit" in that they may look
normal but they are not, a statement wholly unsupported by any scientific
studies 3
40% accuracy, they do not have the data to substantiate the assertion. Id.
326. See ROYAL Soc'Y, RIs5 ANALYSIS, PERCEPTION AND MANAGEMENT 7 (1992)
(explaining that some subjectivity is always a part of risk assessment).
327. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 5, at 1575-77 (noting that the scientific method and
scientific conclusions are not completely objective).
328. See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 152-53 (explaining that the question about how
to apply the information gleaned from an actuarial instrument is a matter of policy and depends
on the relative costs of false positives and false negatives).
329. See id. at 141-42 (noting that actuarial instruments use different variables); see also
Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting Violence
in a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDoZo L. REv. _ (forthcoming 2003) (discussing three
prevalent actuarial instruments and concluding that the most sophisticated by far is the VRAG).
330. Edens et al., supra note 217 (citing and quoting United States v. Barnette, Transcript,
Sentencing Phase, File No. 3:97CR23-P, Feb. 5, 1998). The expert also testified that he based
his opinion on the defendant's callousness, as demonstrated by the defendant's eating lunch
during his discussion with the expert, and his inability to define compassion on an intelligence
test, both similarly unscientific bases. Id.
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C. Assisting the Jury
Gatekeeping standards require that even scientifically valid expert
testimony be capabl. of assisting the jury in its deliberations. 331  Future
dangerousness testimony is the major means of persuading the sentencing jury
that a convicted defendant poses a threat to society and thus merits the death
penalty. 332 Despite problems with the accuracy of violence predictions,
actuarial predictions provide the best information available, and courts should
admit them to help guide decisionmakers in their detenninations.333 The most
hotly debated topic in juror sentencing deliberations, next to the crime itself,
is the issue of the defendant's dangerousness on his return to society.334
Future dangerousness takes precedence injury deliberations over any mitigat-
ing evidence, such as remorse, mental illness, intelligence, drug/alcohol
addiction, and any concern about the defendant's behavior in prison.3 In
fact, dangerousness determinations are part of the explicitly authorized
grounds for imposing death in a number of states, and Texas and Oregon even
require them.336 But whether or not statutes permit or require future danger-
ousness, and whether or not prosecutors even mention it or present it as
evidence in the penalty phase of the case, it remains the major focus of the
factfinders. 3 ' This is true regardless of the presence or absence of expert
testimony about future dangerousness in the hearing.338
331. This issue is the one of fit.
332. Albertson, supra note 292, at 20.
333. The American Bar Association, for example, notes that even though future dangerous-
ness testimony is highly subjective, courts are reluctant to exclude such evidence because it is
the "best information available." See BENCHBOOK, supra note 34, at 49 (noting that courts are
unwilling to exclude evidence of future dangerousness totally because it is superior to the
alternatives).
334. See Blume et al., supra note 214, at 398-99 (observing, on the basis of interviews
with over one hundred capital jurors, that "future dangerousness is in the minds of most capital
jurors, and is thus 'at issue' in virtually all capital trials, no matter what the prosecution says or
does not say").
335. See id. at 404 (noting results of capital juror interviews).
336. See OR. REv. STAT. § 163.150(b) (1999) (future dangerousness is statutory aggravat-
ing factor); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(b) (Vernon 2001) (future dangerous-
ness determinations are authorized ground for death penalty). Idaho, Oklahoma, Virginia, and
Wyoming also have future dangerousness as a statutory aggravating factor. IDAHO CODE § 19-
2515 (k) (Michie Supp. 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12 (West 1983); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2000); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(e) (Michie 2001).
337. See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 132, at 1560 (citing studies emphasizing "the pervasive
role future dangerousness [testimony] plays in and on the minds of capital sentencing jurors").
338. See Blume et al., supra note 214, at 404 (reporting that "even in cases in which the
prosecution's evidence and argument at the penalty phase did 'not at all' emphasize the defen-
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Jurors often believe--incorrectly-that the law requires a death sentence
upon a showing of the defendant's future dangerousness.339 Most people do
not believe that defendants sentenced to life actually must spend the rest of
their lives in prison." They fear a dangerous person's release into the com-
munity; this fear is a highly motivating factor in choosing between death and
a life sentence.34'
A number of factors about jury deliberations increase the likelihood that
jurors will overestimate the threat of future violence. The most important of
these factors is lack of objective information about such predictions.342 -Base
rate errors plague human decisionmaking in general, so there is no reason to
suppose that capital jurors are any different. Moreover, jurors seldom receive
information on the true rate of violent recidivism among murderers released
from prison.343 Interviews with capital jurors revealed that jurors who sen-
tenced the defendant to death had median estimates of 85% that the defendant
would commit a violent crime in the future and a 50% median estimate that
the defendant would commit another murder if the defendant had only re-
ceived a life sentence.3" Yet empirical studies demonstrate a counter-intuitive
dant's future dangerousness, jurors who believed the defendant would be released in under
twenty years if not sentenced to death were still more likely to cast their final vote for death than
were jurors who thought the alternative to death was twenty years or more"). Indeed, it was the
explicit recognition of the importance the jury gives to future dangerousness that motivated the
Supreme Court to rule that defendants have a constitutional right for jurors to be informed of
a death penalty alternative if the prosecution alleges future danger as an aggravating circum-
stance and the alternative is life in prison without parole. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512
U.S. 154, 169 (1994) (ruling that the court should inform a jury of a defendant's ineligibility
for parole when the defendant's future dangerousness is at issue); see also Kelly v. South
Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 248 (2002) (reiterating the Court's earlier holding in Simmons); cf.
Oarvey, supra note 132, at 1560 (observing that "[f]uture dangerousness appears to be one of
the primary determinants of capital-sentencing outcomes").
339. See Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 286, at 1174 (providing that 43% of surveyed
jurors believed that the law required a death sentence upon a showing of future dangerousness).
340. See Simmons, 512 U.S. at 159 (citing South Carolina survey showing that only 7.1%
of all jury-eligible adults surveyed believed that a life sentence meant that the defendant would
be required to spend the rest of his life in prison).
341. See, e.g., id. (noting a survey in which 75% of those surveyed said that the amount
of time actually spent in prison was either "extremely" or "very important" in choosing between
life and death).
342. See Sorensen & Pilgrim, supra note 122, at 1254 (noting that a lack of objective
information about future dangerousness predictions is one of the prime reasons that jurors
overestimate the defendant's threat of future violence).
343. Id. at 1254-55 (noting studies showing that jurors are unaware of the base rates of
violent recidivism among murderers).
344. Id. at 1269.
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decreased base rate for violence among capital commutees in prison.34 In one
study of 188 death-sentenced prisoners whose sentences the courts commuted
after Furman, only one killed again, and only six committed violent offenses
in the more than five years after their release.346 In studies of capital
commutees paroled into the community, twenty percent returned to prison, but
only eight to ten percent committed new felonies. 47 Unless jurors receive
information about population base rates and how they should use them in
making their decisions, risk estimates amount to little more than specula-
tion.34
8
In addition, jurors consistently underestimate the number of years that a
prisoner must serve for a term of "life in prison," which means that the pris-
oner will be much older and have less opportunity in terms of potential-risk
period than jurors believe. One well-established principle of criminology is
that violence and criminal activity decrease with age.349 Base rates of violence
are far lower after the age of sixty (when most life prisoners would be eligible
for parole) than in the twenties. 3s"
These factors provide some reason to believe that probabilistic estimates
would be helpful to the jury. As long as violence risk assessment is not
presented as a yes/no dichotomy, but as a probabilistic assessment, it may aid
decisionmaking. Risk estimates are uncertain, and the base rate of serious
violence among capital offenders is quite low. In order to be helpful, the
expert needs to educate the jury in a scientifically sound manner, including
explicitly stating the statistical basis for the opinion.5 1
Even the most accurate of the actuarial instruments made predictions of
dangerousness for people that did not, in fact, later commit acts of violence.
Of people that the VRAG placed in the "high risk" category, for example, only
55% actually committed violent acts upon release. In other words, 45% did
not. Had the "high risk" prediction been the basis for a death sentence, nearly
half the people sentenced to death would not, in fact, go on to commit any
more acts of violence. Because of the centrality of the dangerousness determi-
nation to juror deliberations, it would help to the jury to have information
345. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 40, at 23 (citing studies).
346. Sorensen & Pilgrim, supra note 122, at 1254-55.
347. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 40, at 24 (citing studies and noting that convicted
defendants must now serve longer minimum sentences before parole, making the defendants in
the studies much younger than current defendants will be when parole eligible).
348. Id. at 24-25.
349. Id. at31.
350. Id. (citing studies).
351. Id. at 36-38 (advocating that experts limit their testimony to predominantly statistical
analyses to avoid going beyond the limits of their scientific expertise).
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relating to it. It should, however, be the best information available. Cur-
rently, actuarial instruments offer the most accurate way of making such
predictions, but the expert must carefully explain the limits of such
testimony.352
VII. Conclusion
Judges are the relevance gatekeepers for good reason. They have training
in critical thinking, they are accountable to superior courts and to legal com-
mentators, and they receive regular feedback regarding how well they have
followed their procedures. They should not abdicate this important responsi-
bility when it comes to expert testimony. If the goal of a justice system is
accurate determinations, limiting evidence to relevant information is sound
cognitive practice.
Rational truth-seeking is the goal ofthe rule of law also, and thus limiting
testimony to what is relevant is a basic notion of procedural fairness. Even
expert testimony must abide by this stricture, and therefore courts should limit
it to what is relevant, which means that it must have a sound scientific basis.
Gatekeeping for scientific validity of expert testimony in capital sentencing
proceedings is therefore basic to the rule of law, with its goal of rational truth-
seeking.
A decision as important as a death sentence simply cannot be based on
bunkum. No civilized country, much less one that prides itself on constitu-
tional principles of due process, should tolerate expert witnesses confusing the
jury with wholly unscientific assertions. So, in addition to being sound
cognitive practice and mandated by the rule of law, judicial gatekeeping to
prevent jury confusion is a minimum for fundamental fairness. Clinical
predictions of future dangerousness cannot meet these standards. Actuarial
testimony can barely squeak through. Predicting violence, like predicting the
weather, is at best subject to a large margin of error. Nonetheless, the struc-
tured reasoning process of actuarial risk analysis is far preferable to the ad hoc
judgments of clinical predictions. In a system that strives for justice, the least
that one can expect is that judges will evaluate expert testimony that may
result in a determination of death with as much care as they routinely use to
scrutinize expert civil testimony.
Judges who evade the scientific issues presented by expert testimony
perpetrate injustice. Providing the jury with misleading and unscientific
evidence violates fundamental rule of law principles and due process and is
352. See, e.g., Monahan & Steadman, supra note 296, at 935-36 (explaining that predic-
tions of the risk of future violence should be modeled explicitly on weather predictions, with
all of their qualifiers and uncertainties).
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intellectually indefensible. The consequences of misleading the jury in a
death sentencing determination are severe, not only for the defendant, but also
for a society that values justice and aspires to rationality. The analytical
framework provided in this Article aims to enable judges to make better
admissibility determinations and to enable juries to reach more reasoned
decisions. At stake is the credibility of the judiciary and the proper function-
ing of the judicial system.
